Efficient Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types, and Interdependent Valuations PDF Download
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Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Nolan Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Panos M. Pardalos
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387772472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 872
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Book Description
This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider mechanism design in social choice problems in which agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, multidimensional, and take on a continuum of possible values. If the center receives a signal that is stochastically related to the agents' types and direct returns are bounded, for any decision rule there is a balanced transfer scheme that ensures that any strategy that is not arbitrarily close to truthful is dominated by one that is. If direct returns are also continuous, truthful revelation becomes a nearly dominant strategy, all Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies are nearly truthful, and at least one such strategy exists. If the center's information is not informative but agents' types are stochastically related, then there are balanced transfers under which truthful revelation is a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium, again for any decision rule. Analogous results hold when agents also take mutually payoff-relevant actions in advance of any action by the center.
Author: Philippe Jehiel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
