Author: Philippe Jehiel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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We consider mechanism design in social choice problems in which agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, multidimensional, and take on a continuum of possible values. If the center receives a signal that is stochastically related to the agents' types and direct returns are bounded, for any decision rule there is a balanced transfer scheme that ensures that any strategy that is not arbitrarily close to truthful is dominated by one that is. If direct returns are also continuous, truthful revelation becomes a nearly dominant strategy, all Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies are nearly truthful, and at least one such strategy exists. If the center's information is not informative but agents' types are stochastically related, then there are balanced transfers under which truthful revelation is a Bayesian epsilon-equilibrium, again for any decision rule. Analogous results hold when agents also take mutually payoff-relevant actions in advance of any action by the center.

Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 33

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Author: Scott Johnson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Author: Ayman Ahmed Sabry Abdel Rahman Ghoneim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 302

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Social choice problems arise frequently in our daily life, where each agent has its own private information (i.e., a type), and all involved agents must agree on one particular outcome in spite of their conflicting preferences over the possible outcomes of the problem. Mechanism design is a general methodology for solving social choice problems by designing mechanisms where agents will be truthful (i.e., report their true types) through eliminating any incentives agents may have from strategic misreporting. Classical mechanism design assumes that an agent's value of any outcome depends only on its type. However in many situations, an agent's value of an outcome depends on the true types of other agents in addition to its own type. In such problems where agents have interdependent valuations, only efficient mechanisms that achieve truthful in ex-post incentive compatibility (i.e., an agent reports its true type only if other agents are rational and reporting truthfully) exist. Efficient strategy-proof mechanisms that achieve the strongest and most preferable form of truthfulness (i.e., an agent reports its true type even if other agents are strategically misreporting their types and/or behaving irrationally) have not been proposed yet for any domain when valuations are interdependent, and when such mechanisms are possible is the research question of this thesis. Unlike classical mechanism design, strategy-proof mechanisms for interdependent valuations can only be provided for a particular domain, because the interdependencies between the agents' valuations vary depending on the problem, and this directly affects how strategy-proofness is established. In this thesis, we focus our attention on the interdependent task allocation and prediction markets problems, and we provide possibility and impossibility results regarding the design of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms along with other desirable properties.

Author: Heng Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. We construct efficient and incentive compatible dynamic mechanisms, based on the inter-temporal correlation of different agents' private information. Our mechanisms highlight the role of history-dependent transfers, a distinctive feature in dynamic mechanism design. Furthermore, the mechanisms are reminiscent of the classical VCG mechanism, although the latter fails under interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information progresses independently, we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments, and provide sufficient conditions for its implementability. These conditions generalize the single-crossing conditions in static problems.

Author: Nolan Miller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Author: Ioannis Caragiannis
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030859479
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 424

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021. The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games.

Author: Guido Schäfer
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031710339
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 549

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