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Author: Joachim Kaldasch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Presented is an analytic microeconomic model of the temporal price dispersion of homogeneous goods in polypoly markets. This new approach is based on the idea that the price dispersion has its origin in the dynamics of the purchase process. The price dispersion is determined by the chance that demanded and supplied product units meet in a given price interval. It can be characterized by a fat-tailed Laplace distribution for short and by a lognormal distribution for long time horizons. Taking random temporal variations of demanded and supplied units into account both the mean price and also the standard deviation of the price dispersion are governed by a lognormal distribution. A comparison with empirical investigations confirms the model statements.
Author: Joachim Kaldasch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Presented is an analytic microeconomic model of the temporal price dispersion of homogeneous goods in polypoly markets. This new approach is based on the idea that the price dispersion has its origin in the dynamics of the purchase process. The price dispersion is determined by the chance that demanded and supplied product units meet in a given price interval. It can be characterized by a fat-tailed Laplace distribution for short and by a lognormal distribution for long time horizons. Taking random temporal variations of demanded and supplied units into account both the mean price and also the standard deviation of the price dispersion are governed by a lognormal distribution. A comparison with empirical investigations confirms the model statements.
Author: Joachim Kaldasch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
A new microeconomic model is presented that aims at a description of the long-term unit sales and price evolution of homogeneous non-durable goods in polypoly markets. It merges the product lifecycle approach with the price dispersion dynamics of homogeneous goods. The model predicts a minimum critical lifetime of non-durables in order to survive. Under the condition that the supply side of the market evolves much faster than the demand side the theory suggests that unsatisfied demands are present in the first stages of the lifecycle. With the growth of production capacities these demands disappear accompanied with a logistic decrease of the mean price of the good. The model is applied to electricity as a non-durable satisfying the model condition. The presented theory allows a deeper understanding of the sales and price dynamics of non-durables.
Author: Ching-jen Sun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Book Description
Abstract: This dissertation develops three essays on dynamic pricing to investigate two important topics in industrial organization: price dispersion and price discrimination. The first essay considers a stylized model of dynamic price competition in which each seller sells one unit of a homogeneous commodity by posting prices in every period to maximize the expected profits with discounting. A random number of buyers come to the market in each period. Each buyer demands at most one unit of the good, and they all have a common reservation price. They know all prices posted by all firms in the market; hence search is costless. I show that when there is a positive probability of excess demand, the model has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each seller posts a price in every period according to a non-degenerate distribution, which is determined by the number of sellers remaining in the market in that period. Sellers play mixed strategies as they are indifferent between selling sooner at a lower price and waiting to sell at a higher price later. Thus, price dispersion not only exists in every period among firms, but also persists over time. In the second essay, I consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Consumers each demand one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, consumers are sorted into different segments according to their first-period choice, and the monopolist can offer different menus of contracts to different segments. In this way, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers not only by product quality, but also by purchase history. I fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when the type space is discrete and a simple condition is given to determine whether the monopolist should price discriminate consumers by product quality in the first period. When the consumers' type space is a continuum, I show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal menu of contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partition PBE (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). The monopolist will offer only one quality in the first period when the social surplus function is log submodular or the firm and consumers are patient. If it is optimal for the firm to offer only one quality in the first period, the optimal market coverage in the first period is smaller than that in the static model. Furthermore, in equilibrium there are some high-type consumers choosing to downgrade the product in the second period, a phenomenon that has never been addressed in the literature. In the second essay, when the consumers' type space is a continuum, the analysis of the optimal menu of contracts is restricted within the class of partition PBE. The third essay provides a justification for this qualification. I ask whether an optimal menu of contracts can induce a non-partition continuation equilibrium by scrutinizing the example constructed by Laffont and Tirole (1988). They construct a non-partition continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of incentive contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. I construct two first-period incentive schemes leading to a partition continuation equilibrium and show that, regardless of the extent of uncertainty, their non-partition continuation equilibrium generates a smaller payoff than one of two partition continuation equilibria for the principal. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal. I provide an intuition behind this result, hoping to shed light on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.
Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
Author: Daniel B. Leiter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Dennis Eggert
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638803473
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1,0, Helsinki School of Economics, course: Industrial Organisation, 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: The main issue in the article is the derivation of a model in which prices can differ in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is asymmetric information in the market. The reason for this price dispersion is caused by consumer heterogeneity. Salop and Stiglitz explain, that "because of differences in preference or ability, some agents perform much better than others in market decisions." To model this kind of heterogeneity they assign different costs of gathering certain information to the consumers. For simplicity they part the consumers in two groups: The first one consists of low-cost information gatherer and the other group has higher cost to gain complete information. For further simplicity there are just two levels of information: to be completely informed or to be not informed at all. Furthermore the costs to become an informed consumer are fixed. The differences in information in this model regard the locations of the shops. All consumers know about all prices that are in the market, they just do not know where the shop with a certain (the lowest) price is. The shops on the other hand have complete information about the market. They know about the differences between the consumers and can compute the demand that will occur, when they ask a certain price. So they face a trade-off between higher prices and lower demand. It is important to state why there is a possibility of raising the price and not to loose all demand like it would be in a perfect market. When the rise in price is not too high, it does not pay for the high-cost information gatherer to become completely informed. Their expected loss by buying randomly either in low- or high-priced shops is lower than the fixed cost of gathering the information. All toget
Author: Dennis Eggert
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638801381
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1,0, Helsinki School of Economics, course: Industrial Organisation, language: English, abstract: The main issue in the article is the derivation of a model in which prices can differ in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is asymmetric information in the market. The reason for this price dispersion is caused by consumer heterogeneity. Salop and Stiglitz explain, that “because of differences in preference or ability, some agents perform much better than others in market decisions.” To model this kind of heterogeneity they assign different costs of gathering certain information to the consumers. For simplicity they part the consumers in two groups: The first one consists of low-cost information gatherer and the other group has higher cost to gain complete information. For further simplicity there are just two levels of information: to be completely informed or to be not informed at all. Furthermore the costs to become an informed consumer are fixed. The differences in information in this model regard the locations of the shops. All consumers know about all prices that are in the market, they just do not know where the shop with a certain (the lowest) price is. The shops on the other hand have complete information about the market. They know about the differences between the consumers and can compute the demand that will occur, when they ask a certain price. So they face a trade-off between higher prices and lower demand. It is important to state why there is a possibility of raising the price and not to loose all demand like it would be in a perfect market. When the rise in price is not too high, it does not pay for the high-cost information gatherer to become completely informed. Their expected loss by buying randomly either in low- or high-priced shops is lower than the fixed cost of gathering the information. All together this consumer heterogeneity and the fully informed shops can lead to price dispersion in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is the difference in information between the actors.
Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Author: Dieter Pennerstorfer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous-goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse-U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.
Author: Craig Pirrong
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139501976
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 238
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Book Description
Commodities have become an important component of many investors' portfolios and the focus of much political controversy over the past decade. This book utilizes structural models to provide a better understanding of how commodities' prices behave and what drives them. It exploits differences across commodities and examines a variety of predictions of the models to identify where they work and where they fail. The findings of the analysis are useful to scholars, traders and policy makers who want to better understand often puzzling - and extreme - movements in the prices of commodities from aluminium to oil to soybeans to zinc.
