Does Auditor Tenure Matter? Audit Partner Rotation and Industry Specialization in the U.S.

Does Auditor Tenure Matter? Audit Partner Rotation and Industry Specialization in the U.S. PDF Author: Danielle Sarah Lazerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Does Auditor Tenure Matter? Audit Partner Rotation and Industry Specialization in the U.S.

Does Auditor Tenure Matter? Audit Partner Rotation and Industry Specialization in the U.S. PDF Author: Danielle Sarah Lazerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence

Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence PDF Author: Chee Yeow Lim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Book Description
We investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence. Although prior studies have investigated the relation between extended auditor-client tenure and audit quality, none has examined how this relation is jointly influenced by both auditor specialization and fee dependence. Our main analyses, using accrual quality as a measure of audit quality, show that firms audited by specialists (vs. non-specialists) have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure, and that this relation is negatively moderated by auditors' fee dependence on clients. These results are robust to sensitivity tests, and alternative proxies for audit quality such as the issuance of going concern opinions and the market's response to quarterly earnings surprises.

The Routledge Companion to Auditing

The Routledge Companion to Auditing PDF Author: David Hay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136210350
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 387

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Book Description
Auditing has been a subject of some controversy, and there have been repeated attempts at reforming its practice globally. This comprehensive companion surveys the state of the discipline, including emerging and cutting-edge trends. It covers the most important and controversial issues, including auditing ethics, auditor independence, social and environmental accounting as well as the future of the field. This handbook is vital reading for legislators, regulators, professionals, commentators, students and researchers involved with auditing and accounting. The collection will also prove an ideal starting place for researchers from other fields looking to break into this vital subject.

Audit Partner Tenure, Audit Firm Tenure, and Discretionary Accruals

Audit Partner Tenure, Audit Firm Tenure, and Discretionary Accruals PDF Author: Chih-Ying Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Mandatory audit partner rotation has been adopted in certain countries while audit firm rotation is still being debated in many places. Most of the extant research on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality provides evidence at the audit firm level. However, since audit firm tenure is correlated with partner tenure and audit firm rotation is more costly than partner rotation, it is important to know whether earnings quality is related to audit firm tenure, partner tenure, or both. We investigate this issue using a sample of Taiwanese companies for which the audit report must be signed by two partners with their names disclosed in the report. Using performance adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality, we find that the absolute and positive values of discretionary accruals decrease significantly with partner tenure. After controlling for partner tenure, we find that absolute discretionary accruals decrease significantly with audit firm tenure. Our findings are not consistent with the arguments that earnings quality decreases with extended audit partner tenure and that audit firm rotation in addition to partner rotation would improve earnings quality. Our results are robust to alternative ways of measuring partner tenure under the dual signature system. However, since the audit reports do not disclose which partner is responsible for maintaining the auditor-client relationship, measurement errors in partner tenure remain an issue that cannot be fully addressed in the context of our study.

Regulation and the Accounting Profession

Regulation and the Accounting Profession PDF Author: John W. Buckley
Publisher: Belmont, Calif. : Lifetime Learning Publications
ISBN:
Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 266

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Auditor Tenure, Auditor Specialization, and Information Asymmetry

Auditor Tenure, Auditor Specialization, and Information Asymmetry PDF Author: Ali R. Almutairi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This paper examines the association between bid-ask spread, a market based measure of information asymmetry, and auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. Our results show that information asymmetry is negatively related to the employment of an industry specialist auditor and positively related to audit firm tenure. These results are consistent across measures of specialization based on market share, portfolio share, and a composite measure of specialization introduced by Neal and Riley (2004). However, further tests refine those conclusions, in that the positive association between tenure and information asymmetry differs between specialist and non-specialist auditors. Specifically, we find that bid-ask spread is increasing in tenure for clients of non-specialist regardless of which measure of specialization is used, while the relation between bid-ask spread and tenure is statistically significant for clients of specialists for only one of the three specialization measures. These findings are consistent with a market that perceives audit quality diminishing with tenure for non-specialist auditors; and a market that finds audit quality increasing with industry specialization.

Does Increased Audit Partner Tenure Reduce Audit Quality?

Does Increased Audit Partner Tenure Reduce Audit Quality? PDF Author: Jerry L. Turner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1

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Book Description
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the audit every five years so the engagement can be viewed quot;with fresh and skeptical eyes.quot; Using data obtained from actual audits by multiple U.S. offices of three large international audit firms, we examine whether there is a relationship between evidence of reduced audit quality, measured by estimated discretionary accruals, and audit partner tenure with a specific client. We find that estimated discretionary accruals are significantly and negatively associated with the lead audit partner's tenure with a specific client. Thus, audit quality appears to increase with increased partner tenure. After controlling for client size and engagement risk, we find audit partner tenure significantly and negatively associated with estimated discretionary accruals only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years, regardless of risk level. We also find that tenure is not significantly associated with estimated discretionary accruals for large clients. This suggests that as partner tenure increases, auditors of small client firms become less willing to accept more aggressive financial statement assertions by managers, and that partner tenure does not affect audit quality for large clients or for shorter-tenure smaller clients. Our results relating to audit partner tenure are consistent with the conclusions about audit firm tenure by Geiger and Raghunandan (2002); Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002);Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003); and Nagy (2005) and extend their findings by focusing on individual audit partners rather than on audit firms.

On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure and Rotation

On the Economics of Audit Partner Tenure and Rotation PDF Author: Brandon Gipper
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Audited financial statements
Languages : en
Pages : 69

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Book Description
This paper provides the first partner tenure and rotation analysis for a large cross-section of U.S. publicly listed firms over an extended period. We analyze the effects on audit quality as well as economic tradeoffs related to partner tenure and rotation with respect to audit hours and fees. On average, we find no evidence for audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for fresh-look benefits after rotations. Nevertheless, partner rotations have significant economic consequences. We find increases in audit fees and decreases in audit hours over the tenure cycle, which differ by partner experience, client size, and competitiveness of the local audit market. More generally, our findings are consistent with efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations. We also analyze special circumstances, such as audit firm switches and early partner rotations, and show that they are more disruptive than mandatory rotations, and also more likely to exhibit audit quality effects.

Audit Partner Tenure

Audit Partner Tenure PDF Author: Roger Simnet
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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Auditor Tenure, Information Asymmetry and Earnings Quality

Auditor Tenure, Information Asymmetry and Earnings Quality PDF Author: Sidney Leung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54

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Book Description
We confirm the results of prior studies that auditor tenure improves earnings quality on average. We extend their findings to show that the improvement in earnings quality resulting from longer auditor tenure is greater for firms with higher information asymmetry, after controlling for auditor's industry specialization. We argue that audits of client firms with higher information asymmetry demand more client specific knowledge that cannot be gleaned from industry or general experience. Longer tenure helps auditors acquire such knowledge and therefore, the benefit of longer audit tenure is greater in firms with greater information asymmetry. We use bid-ask spread, return volatility, intensity of R&D expenditure and a composite distance measure to measure information asymmetry. Our results imply that frequent auditor changes are costlier for firms with higher information asymmetry. At the policy level, our results imply that mandatory auditor rotation is more (less) costly for firms with high (low) information asymmetry.