Dependent Compliance PDF Download

Author: Katherine Kitts Unger
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781303444050
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Most human rights treaties have no mechanism of enforcement, which leaves one wondering why any states comply. I attempt to address a piece of this puzzle by examining whether greater dependence on co-signatories of a treaty increases a state's level of compliance to that treaty. Past literature has found that states that more highly value their relationships with other states are more likely to cooperate. I argue that a greater dependence on treaty co-signatories will increase the value a state places on its relationship with co-signatories. As a result, I expect greater dependence to increase compliance. To carry out my study I use a networks analysis-derived measure of dependence based on levels of trade, common IGO membership, and alliances. Examining two different human rights treaties, I use a Heckman selection model to test my hypothesis, modeling compliance as a function of dependence and other control variables. In support of my hypothesis, I find that states with greater levels of dependence on treaty co-signatories do tend to have higher levels of compliance. Such a finding has important policy implications, indicating that opening up trade, IGO, and/or alliance relations with non-complying states may, in fact, have the effect of improving their respect for human rights, thereby suggesting that perhaps sanctions are not the most effective route to curb human rights violations.