Author: Amiram Ezov
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789655505498
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
After being taken by surprise on October 6, 1973, just like the Red Army was in 1941, with its defense line breached and its political leaders unnerved, the Israeli Defense Forces managed to pull itself together. Successfully repelling Egyptian attacks, it took initiative on October 15, launching its decisive maneuver; the Crossing of the Suez. This book, published after a long struggle with Israeli Military establishment, tells the full story of this campaign, from its prewar planning, through wartime operational and technical challenges, until its successful culmination; the delivery of Israeli armored forces west of the Canal, which eventually forced Egypt to the negotiation table. The Crossing of the Suez was, at that time, the most difficult campaign the IDF had ever waged. It bred some difficult questions which remain unanswered and controversies which still resonate within the Israeli military establishment and general population. This book offers a neutral, new point of view about these controversies, based on first-hand testimonies which fully reveal the infighting among Israeli senior command; the tension between the offensive-minded Ariel Sharon and his more cautious superiors. The author, Dr. Amiram Ezov, formerly an IDF infantry and artillery officer, worked in IDF's History Department over the course of 14 years, where he published several volumes about the Southern Front in the Yom Kippur War; some of which are still classified. He has been investigating the Israeli Crossing Campaign, code name Operation Valiant, since 2006. "A fascinating book, one of the most important works dealing with that war....revealing, for the first time, the behind-the-scenes secrets of the Crossing's planning." Ronen Bergman, a senior Israeli military reporter, author of Yom Kippur War-Real Time.
Crossing Suez, 1973
Author: Amiram Ezov
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789655505498
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
After being taken by surprise on October 6, 1973, just like the Red Army was in 1941, with its defense line breached and its political leaders unnerved, the Israeli Defense Forces managed to pull itself together. Successfully repelling Egyptian attacks, it took initiative on October 15, launching its decisive maneuver; the Crossing of the Suez. This book, published after a long struggle with Israeli Military establishment, tells the full story of this campaign, from its prewar planning, through wartime operational and technical challenges, until its successful culmination; the delivery of Israeli armored forces west of the Canal, which eventually forced Egypt to the negotiation table. The Crossing of the Suez was, at that time, the most difficult campaign the IDF had ever waged. It bred some difficult questions which remain unanswered and controversies which still resonate within the Israeli military establishment and general population. This book offers a neutral, new point of view about these controversies, based on first-hand testimonies which fully reveal the infighting among Israeli senior command; the tension between the offensive-minded Ariel Sharon and his more cautious superiors. The author, Dr. Amiram Ezov, formerly an IDF infantry and artillery officer, worked in IDF's History Department over the course of 14 years, where he published several volumes about the Southern Front in the Yom Kippur War; some of which are still classified. He has been investigating the Israeli Crossing Campaign, code name Operation Valiant, since 2006. "A fascinating book, one of the most important works dealing with that war....revealing, for the first time, the behind-the-scenes secrets of the Crossing's planning." Ronen Bergman, a senior Israeli military reporter, author of Yom Kippur War-Real Time.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789655505498
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 360
Book Description
After being taken by surprise on October 6, 1973, just like the Red Army was in 1941, with its defense line breached and its political leaders unnerved, the Israeli Defense Forces managed to pull itself together. Successfully repelling Egyptian attacks, it took initiative on October 15, launching its decisive maneuver; the Crossing of the Suez. This book, published after a long struggle with Israeli Military establishment, tells the full story of this campaign, from its prewar planning, through wartime operational and technical challenges, until its successful culmination; the delivery of Israeli armored forces west of the Canal, which eventually forced Egypt to the negotiation table. The Crossing of the Suez was, at that time, the most difficult campaign the IDF had ever waged. It bred some difficult questions which remain unanswered and controversies which still resonate within the Israeli military establishment and general population. This book offers a neutral, new point of view about these controversies, based on first-hand testimonies which fully reveal the infighting among Israeli senior command; the tension between the offensive-minded Ariel Sharon and his more cautious superiors. The author, Dr. Amiram Ezov, formerly an IDF infantry and artillery officer, worked in IDF's History Department over the course of 14 years, where he published several volumes about the Southern Front in the Yom Kippur War; some of which are still classified. He has been investigating the Israeli Crossing Campaign, code name Operation Valiant, since 2006. "A fascinating book, one of the most important works dealing with that war....revealing, for the first time, the behind-the-scenes secrets of the Crossing's planning." Ronen Bergman, a senior Israeli military reporter, author of Yom Kippur War-Real Time.
The Yom Kippur War
Author: Abraham Rabinovich
Publisher: Schocken
ISBN: 0307429652
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 590
Book Description
An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.
Publisher: Schocken
ISBN: 0307429652
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 590
Book Description
An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.
The Yom Kippur War
Author: Simon Dunstan
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
ISBN: 9781846032882
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
On October 6, 1973, simultaneous attacks on two fronts caught Israel by surprise, on the holiest day of the Jewish year. With Israeli forcxes caught unprepared, the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal, and the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights were both initially successful. The following month saw desperate fighting as the Israeli forces slowly drove the invading armies back. It took two UN ceasefires, and the threat of Soviet intervention before the Israeli forces came to a halt. Simon Dunstan offers a balanced analysis of the Yom Kippur War, describing the key battles and the forces involved and examining the outcome of the war - how at national and international levels the war was a disaster from which Israel has not recovered, as the nation became dependant on the USA for military, diplomatic and economic support. Illustrated with full-color artwork, photographs and detailed maps, this book provides an insight into the hostilities that enveloped the Middle East, the aftereffects of which are still seen today.
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
ISBN: 9781846032882
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
On October 6, 1973, simultaneous attacks on two fronts caught Israel by surprise, on the holiest day of the Jewish year. With Israeli forcxes caught unprepared, the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal, and the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights were both initially successful. The following month saw desperate fighting as the Israeli forces slowly drove the invading armies back. It took two UN ceasefires, and the threat of Soviet intervention before the Israeli forces came to a halt. Simon Dunstan offers a balanced analysis of the Yom Kippur War, describing the key battles and the forces involved and examining the outcome of the war - how at national and international levels the war was a disaster from which Israel has not recovered, as the nation became dependant on the USA for military, diplomatic and economic support. Illustrated with full-color artwork, photographs and detailed maps, this book provides an insight into the hostilities that enveloped the Middle East, the aftereffects of which are still seen today.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross Of Decisive Victory [Illustrated Edition]
Author: Dr. George W. Gawrych
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252791
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252791
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrations Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Key to the Sinai
Author: George Walter Gawrych
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Abu Ageila, Battle of, Abū ʻUjaylah, Egypt, 1956
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Abu Ageila, Battle of, Abū ʻUjaylah, Egypt, 1956
Languages : en
Pages : 164
Book Description
The Yom Kippur War
Author:
Publisher: Doubleday Books
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 580
Book Description
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
Publisher: Doubleday Books
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 580
Book Description
Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.
At the Decisive Point in the Sinai
Author: Jacob Even
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813169577
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
A commander and an officer with the IDF recount their experiences in the Yom Kippur War, offering insight into Israel’s military leadership. At the Decisive Point in the Sinai is a firsthand account of Operation Stouthearted Men—arguably the 1973 Yom Kippur War’s most intense engagement. General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Moaz were key leaders in Major General Ariel Sharon’s division. Together, Even and Maoz recount the initial stages of the Suez crossing, examine the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) response to Egypt’s surprise attack, and explain Sharon’s role in the transition from defense to offense. They detail Sharon’s struggle to convince his superiors of his plan and argue that an effective division commander is not only revealed by his leadership of subordinates but also by his ability to influence his senior officers. Even and Maoz challenge students of military leadership by offering a case study on effective leadership. “At the Decisive Point is the single best volume I have ever read on the Yom Kippur War. It bridges the gap between the two standard forms of writing on the 1973 conflict?the memoir and the historical monograph?and does so in a very effective manner.” —Robert M. Citino, author of The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 “The authors’ work, in sum, presents an interesting and informative account of the Yom Kippur War on the Sinai front.” —Israel Affairs
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813169577
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 348
Book Description
A commander and an officer with the IDF recount their experiences in the Yom Kippur War, offering insight into Israel’s military leadership. At the Decisive Point in the Sinai is a firsthand account of Operation Stouthearted Men—arguably the 1973 Yom Kippur War’s most intense engagement. General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Moaz were key leaders in Major General Ariel Sharon’s division. Together, Even and Maoz recount the initial stages of the Suez crossing, examine the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) response to Egypt’s surprise attack, and explain Sharon’s role in the transition from defense to offense. They detail Sharon’s struggle to convince his superiors of his plan and argue that an effective division commander is not only revealed by his leadership of subordinates but also by his ability to influence his senior officers. Even and Maoz challenge students of military leadership by offering a case study on effective leadership. “At the Decisive Point is the single best volume I have ever read on the Yom Kippur War. It bridges the gap between the two standard forms of writing on the 1973 conflict?the memoir and the historical monograph?and does so in a very effective manner.” —Robert M. Citino, author of The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 “The authors’ work, in sum, presents an interesting and informative account of the Yom Kippur War on the Sinai front.” —Israel Affairs
The Arab Military Option
Author: Saad Shazly
Publisher: American Mideast Research
ISBN: 9780960456215
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 366
Book Description
Analyse af den arabiske verdens muligheder for at genvinde de af Israel besatte territorier. Bogen gennemgår landenes politik, de væbnede styrker og våbenindustri med eventuelle kernevåben, såvel stærke som svage sider. Bogen fortæller også om supermagternes forhold til de konfliktramte stater og om verdensopinionen.
Publisher: American Mideast Research
ISBN: 9780960456215
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 366
Book Description
Analyse af den arabiske verdens muligheder for at genvinde de af Israel besatte territorier. Bogen gennemgår landenes politik, de væbnede styrker og våbenindustri med eventuelle kernevåben, såvel stærke som svage sider. Bogen fortæller også om supermagternes forhold til de konfliktramte stater og om verdensopinionen.
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army
Author: Youssef Aboul-Enein
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612514596
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 173
Book Description
Central to CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein's career has been the mission to introduce America's military leaders to Arabic works of military significance. Just like American military leaders who had an obsession for all things Russian during the Cold War in order to understand the Soviets, the war on al-Qaida and the complex nuances of the Arab Spring demand a deeper comprehension of the Middle East from direct sources. The memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian War Minister from 1967 to 1971, were first published in 1984, but his work has not ben translated and remains undiscovered by English speaking readers. Many in the United States Armed Services have yet to be introduced to his ideas, perspectives, and the seeds by which the 1973 Yom-Kippur War were laid. In this new contribution to his series of essays written for Infantry Journal, Aboul-Enein has determined to bring to life the military thoughts of this Arab War Minister. This book is a joint Infantry-Naval Institute Press project that has condensed the entire collection of essays on Fawzi to a single volume, to provide future generations of America’s military leaders with access his ideas. Fawzi is unique among Arab generals for his scathing critique of his own armed forces, and from his critical examination of what went wrong in 1967, he was able to slowly resurrect the Egyptian Armed Forces to a level that enabled Sadat to consider an offensive in 1973. This Egyptian general will provide insights into the level of Soviet cooperation and military aid provided Egypt after the 1967 Six-Day War, known simply in Arabic by one word, al-Naksah (the setback), not to be confused with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War known by one word, al-Nakbah (the catastrophe). While Fawzi lapses into conspiracy, indulges in wishful thinking, and employs the language of pan-Arabism on occasion, much like Soviet military theorists couched their ideas in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, this will not stop serious American students of war from recognizing his brilliance about the lessons learned from the crushing defeat of Egyptian arms in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612514596
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 173
Book Description
Central to CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein's career has been the mission to introduce America's military leaders to Arabic works of military significance. Just like American military leaders who had an obsession for all things Russian during the Cold War in order to understand the Soviets, the war on al-Qaida and the complex nuances of the Arab Spring demand a deeper comprehension of the Middle East from direct sources. The memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian War Minister from 1967 to 1971, were first published in 1984, but his work has not ben translated and remains undiscovered by English speaking readers. Many in the United States Armed Services have yet to be introduced to his ideas, perspectives, and the seeds by which the 1973 Yom-Kippur War were laid. In this new contribution to his series of essays written for Infantry Journal, Aboul-Enein has determined to bring to life the military thoughts of this Arab War Minister. This book is a joint Infantry-Naval Institute Press project that has condensed the entire collection of essays on Fawzi to a single volume, to provide future generations of America’s military leaders with access his ideas. Fawzi is unique among Arab generals for his scathing critique of his own armed forces, and from his critical examination of what went wrong in 1967, he was able to slowly resurrect the Egyptian Armed Forces to a level that enabled Sadat to consider an offensive in 1973. This Egyptian general will provide insights into the level of Soviet cooperation and military aid provided Egypt after the 1967 Six-Day War, known simply in Arabic by one word, al-Naksah (the setback), not to be confused with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War known by one word, al-Nakbah (the catastrophe). While Fawzi lapses into conspiracy, indulges in wishful thinking, and employs the language of pan-Arabism on occasion, much like Soviet military theorists couched their ideas in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, this will not stop serious American students of war from recognizing his brilliance about the lessons learned from the crushing defeat of Egyptian arms in the 1967 Six-Day War.
West Germany and Israel
Author: Carole Fink
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107075459
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 371
Book Description
A new history of the West German-Israeli relationship as these two countries faced terrorism, war, and economic upheaval in a global Cold War environment.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107075459
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 371
Book Description
A new history of the West German-Israeli relationship as these two countries faced terrorism, war, and economic upheaval in a global Cold War environment.