Credible Disinflation Programs

Credible Disinflation Programs PDF Author: Pierre-Richard Agénor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deflation (Finance).
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Book Description

Credible Disinflation Programs

Credible Disinflation Programs PDF Author: Pierre-Richard Agénor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deflation (Finance).
Languages : en
Pages : 28

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Book Description


On Credible Disinflation

On Credible Disinflation PDF Author: Mr.Jorge Roldos
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451851340
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
We study the effects of a credible, gradual exchange rate based disinflation program in a two sector economy. After an initial real exchange rate depreciation, the reductions in the rate of devaluation reduce the monetary wedge generated by a cash in advance constraint, leading to a gradual increase in absorption that yields progressive real exchange rate appreciations and current account deficits. An initial boom in economic activity is not followed by a later contraction, as labor supply expands during the whole length of the program.

Credibility Effects of Price Controls in Disinflation Programs

Credibility Effects of Price Controls in Disinflation Programs PDF Author: Pierre-Richard Agénor
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451850484
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 23

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Book Description
This paper examines whether price controls may enhance the credibility of a disinflation program, using a framework in which agents behave strategically. The analysis indicates that a partial price freeze is not fully credible, and may result in inflation inertia. The authorities may be able to determine optimally the intensity of price controls so as to minimize the policy loss associated with a discretionary monetary strategy. But the optimal intensity of controls is shown to be significantly different from zero only if the cost of enforcing price ceilings is not too high, or if the weight attached to price distortions in the policymaker’s loss function is small.

On Credible Disinflation

On Credible Disinflation PDF Author: Jorge Roldós
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
We study the effects of a credible, gradual exchange rate based disinflation program in a two sector economy. After an initial real exchange rate depreciation, the reductions in the rate of devaluation reduce the monetary wedge generated by a cash in advance constraint, leading to a gradual increase in absorption that yields progressive real exchange rate appreciations and current account deficits. An initial boom in economic activity is not followed by a later contraction, as labor supply expands during the whole length of the program.

Supply-Side Effects of Disinflation Programs

Supply-Side Effects of Disinflation Programs PDF Author: Mr.Jorge Roldos
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451954425
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description
This paper focuses on the short-run and long-run supply-side effects of disinflation programs in a two-sector economy. Fixing the exchange rate reduces the wedge between the return on foreign assets and that on domestic capital, leading to an increase in the latter. After an initial real exchange rate appreciation and increase in the production of nontradables—due to a consumption boom—the new capital is gradually installed in the tradable sector. During this transitional period, further real appreciation takes place—as the expansion of the tradable sector pulls labor away from the nontradable sector—together with investment-driven deficits in the current account. We conclude that when appreciation and deficits are due to supply-side rigidities, rather than to credibility and/or price stickiness, no further policies (i.e., capital controls, incomes policies) are advisable.

Credibility effects of price controls in disinflation programs

Credibility effects of price controls in disinflation programs PDF Author: Fondo Monetario Internacional
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 17

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Book Description


Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund

Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund PDF Author: Mr.Carlo Cottarelli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451969333
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
This paper argues that many developing countries may find it difficult to buttress disinflation programs purely through the adoption of traditional credibility-enhancing devices (such as monetary anchors and central bank independence), owing to “technical problems” (for example, high instability of money demand, increased capital mobility) and an insufficient endowment of credibility in the political institutions. In these cases, borrowing credibility from an outside agency like the International Monetary Fund may be the most effective solution. The paper discusses the different options that would allow the Fund to support programs aimed not at external adjustment—the Fund’s traditional role—but at disinflation.

Contracts, Credibility, and Disinflation

Contracts, Credibility, and Disinflation PDF Author: Stanley Fischer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Estimates of the cost of disinflation made before the recent reduction in the inflation rate varied widely. Estimates were made in terms of the sacrifice ratio -- the percentage points of GNP at an annual rate lost per percentage point reduction in the inflation rate. At one extreme it was argued thata resolute and credible monetary policy could reduce inflation virtually costlessly. At the other extreme were estimates that the sacrifice ratio exceeded 10. Costless immediate disinflation is not possible in an economy with long-term labor contracts. This paper sets out a simple contracting model of wage and output determination and uses it to calculate sacrifice ratios for a disinflation program, under the assumption that announced policy changes are immediately believed. Under this assumption disinflation with a structure of labor contracts like those of the United States would be less costly than typically estimated.The model is then modified to allow for the slow adjustment of expectations of policy to actual policy; sacrifice ratios then approach the ranges typically estimated. The sacrifice ratio for the current disinflation is calculated in the last section: the current disinflation was somewhat more rapid and less costly than previous estimates suggested. The calculated sacrifice ratio is consistent with the predictions of the simple contracting model

Monopolistic Competition, Credibility and the Output Costs of Disinflation Programs

Monopolistic Competition, Credibility and the Output Costs of Disinflation Programs PDF Author: Sweder Van Wijnbergen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 47

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Book Description
Brazil, Argentina and Israel all used price controls as part of disinflation programs in 1985-1986. In each case they were intended to break an "inertial" component of inflation. This paper focuses on a specific mechanism through which inflation inertia can emerge: the interaction between lack of credibility of government monetary policy announcements and the price setting behavior of forward looking firms. We show that this interaction can lead to inertia extending well beyond the price setting period; that is important since the price setting period is likely to be short in high inflation economies. We develop an open economy macromodel in which firms set prices before uncertainty about government monetary policy is resolved. Lack of credibility is then shown to lead to output losses during a disinflation program. We demonstrate the effects of price controls and show that their temporary use can be defended on welfare grounds. The paper analyzes asset price behavior during disinflation programs with and without price controls and the influence of credibility problems. We discuss nominal and real interest rates, the stock market and exchange rates. Finally we show that if past government policy has any information content about future government policy, cheating on current announcements of tight policy buys current employment gains during the price control period at the cost of higher inflation afterwards. Sustaining low inflation after the price control period thus requires restrictive monetary policy during the price control period

Models of Inflation and the Costs of Disinflation

Models of Inflation and the Costs of Disinflation PDF Author: Mr.Bankim Chadha
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
This paper focuses on the output costs of disinflation. A model of inflation with both forward and backward elements seems to characterize reality. Such an inflation model is estimated using data for industrial countries, and the output costs of a disinflation path are calculated, first analytically in a simple theoretical model, then by simulation of a global, multi-region empirical model. The credibility of a preannounced path for money consistent with the lowest output loss is considered. An alternative, more credible policy may be to announce an exchange rate peg to a low inflation currency.