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Category : American poetry
Languages : en
Pages : 884
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Book Description
Author: Penelope Douglas
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0593641973
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 561
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Book Description
Three of them, one of her, and a remote cabin in the woods. Let the hot, winter nights ensue in this steamy dark romance from New York Times bestselling author Penelope Douglas, now with bonus material. Tiernan de Haas doesn't care about anything anymore. The only child of a film producer and his starlet wife, she's grown up with wealth and privilege but not love or guidance. And when her parents suddenly pass away, she knows she should be devastated. But she's always been alone, hasn't she? Jake Van der Berg, her father's stepbrother and her only living relative, assumes guardianship of Tiernan. Sent to live in the mountains of Colorado with Jake and his two sons, Noah and Kaleb, Tiernan quickly learns that these men now have a say in what she chooses to care and not care about anymore. As the men take Tiernan under their wing, she slowly finds her place among them. Because lines blur and rules become easy to break when no one else is watching. One of them has her. The other one wants her. But he's going to keep her.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : American poetry
Languages : en
Pages : 884
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Book Description
Author: Anna Mahtani
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198847890
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
The credence framework is widely used for working with probabilities in science, social science, and policy. Anna Mahtani argues that credences are not about objects in themselves, but rather about objects under a designator, and that this insight has far-reaching implications for our understanding of rationality, decision theory, and economics.
Author: Richard Pettigrew
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198732716
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 251
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Book Description
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
Author: Julia Staffel
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198833717
Category : Rationalism
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? What makes their degrees of belief rational, and how should they reason about uncertain matters? In epistemology, recent research has attempted to answer these questions by developing formal models of ideally rational credences. However, we know from psychological research that perfect rationality is unattainable for human thinkers--and so this raises the question of how rational ideals can apply to human thinkers. A popular reply is that the more a thinker's imperfectly rational credences approximate compliance with norms of ideal rationality, the better. But what exactly does this mean? Why is it better to be less irrational, if we can't ever be completely rational? And what does being closer to ideally rational amount to? If ideal models of rationality are supposed to help us understand the rationality of human, imperfect thinkers, we need answers to these questions. Unsettled Thoughts breaks new ground in the study of rationality in providing these answers: we can explain why it's better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate and better at guiding our actions. Moreover, the way in which approximating ideal rationality is beneficial can be made formally precise by using a variety of distance measures that track the benefits of being more rational.
Author: John Pittard
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190051825
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Book Description
The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment contests this skeptical conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident belief even in the face of the epistemic worries posed by disagreement. John Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing approaches to disagreement that allow for the unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. He emphasizes the importance of having rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook; however, he challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of insight, arguing that many of the rational insights crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through relevant emotional experiences. In the second part of the book, Pittard considers the implications that accepting the impartiality requirement favored by "disagreement skeptics" has for religious commitment. He challenges the common assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality would rule out confident religious belief. He further argues, however, that such an impartiality commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and might prevent one from rationally engaging in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever. This troubling conclusion gives reason to hope that the arguments against impartiality are correct and that one can justify conviction despite widespread disagreement.
Author: Paul Weirich
Publisher: MDPI
ISBN: 3038424226
Category : Epistemics
Languages : en
Pages : 189
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Book Description
This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic" that was published in Games
Author: Markus Knauff
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262045079
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 879
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Book Description
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.
Author: Tamar Szabó Gendler
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199672709
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 359
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Book Description
This work is a major biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field of epistemology.
Author: Ralph Wedgwood
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198874499
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 325
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Book Description
This book gives a general theory of rational belief. Although it can be read by itself, is a sequel to the author's previous book The Value of Rationality (Oxford, 2017). It takes the general conception of rationality that was defended in that earlier book, and combines it with an account of the varieties of belief, and of what it is for these beliefs to count as "correct", to develop an account of what it is for beliefs to count as rational. According to this account, rationality comes in degrees: the degree to which one's beliefs counts as rational is determined by their distance from a corresponding probability function - where this distance is measured by those beliefs' "expected degree of incorrectness" according to the probability function; the account also involves an explanation of what determines exactly which probability function plays this role in each case, and of why this probability function should play this role. In developing and defending this account, new light is shed on several central epistemological issues. These issues include: the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; the debates between internalism and externalism, and between foundationalism and coherentism; the significance - or lack of it - of the notion of 'evidence'; the relationship between credences, full belief, inference, and suspension of judgment; the nature of the kind of possibility that is presupposed by the relevant sort of probability; and whether rationality is "diachronic" - so that the beliefs that it is rational for us to have now depend, in part, on the beliefs that we held in the past. Finally, some suggestions are made about how this theory bears on a range of further topics, including the defeasibility of inference, scepticism, and the analysis of knowledge.
