Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam PDF Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273

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Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam PDF Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273

Get Book Here

Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam PDF Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Praeger
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 280

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Book Description
Compares performances of the British and U.S. Armies in Southeast Asia to isolate key variables that allowed or prevented successful adaptation to events on the ground.

Knife Fights

Knife Fights PDF Author: John A. Nagl
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0698176359
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 260

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Book Description
From one of the most important army officers of his generation, a memoir of the revolution in warfare he helped lead, in combat and in Washington When John Nagl was an army tank commander in the first Gulf War of 1991, fresh out of West Point and Oxford, he could already see that America’s military superiority meant that the age of conventional combat was nearing an end. Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. But that made him an outsider within the army; and as if to double down on his dissidence, he scorned the conventional path to a general’s stars and got the military to send him back to Oxford to study the history of counterinsurgency in earnest, searching for guideposts for America. The result would become the bible of the counterinsurgency movement, a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. But it would take the events of 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give counterinsurgency urgent contemporary relevance. John Nagl’s ideas finally met their war. But even as his book began ricocheting around the Pentagon, Nagl, now operations officer of a tank battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed to a particularly unsettled quadrant of Iraq. Here theory met practice, violently. No one knew how messy even the most successful counterinsurgency campaign is better than Nagl, and his experience in Anbar Province cemented his view. After a year’s hard fighting, Nagl was sent to the Pentagon to work for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, where he was tapped by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new army and marine counterinsurgency field manual, rewriting core army doctrine in the middle of two bloody land wars and helping the new ideas win acceptance in one of the planet’s most conservative bureaucracies. That doctrine changed the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Nagl is not blind to the costs or consequences of counterinsurgency, a policy he compared to “eating soup with a knife.” The men who died under his command in Iraq will haunt him to his grave. When it comes to war, there are only bad choices; the question is only which ones are better and which worse. Nagl’s memoir is a profound education in modern war—in theory, in practice, and in the often tortured relationship between the two. It is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.

A Question of Command

A Question of Command PDF Author: Mark Moyar
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300156014
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 384

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Book Description
Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency PDF Author: Douglas Porch
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107027381
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 449

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Book Description
Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.

Wrong Turn

Wrong Turn PDF Author: Gian Gentile
Publisher: New Press, The
ISBN: 1595588965
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 142

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Book Description
A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic

Resisting Rebellion

Resisting Rebellion PDF Author: Anthony James Joes
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 9780813191706
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 364

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Book Description
In Resisting Rebellion, Anthony James Joes explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. Insurgencies arise from many sources of discontent, including foreign occupation, fraudulent elections, and religious persecution, but they also stem from ethnic hostilities, the aspirations of would-be elites, and traditions of political violence. Because insurgency is as much a political phenomenon as a military one, effective counterinsurgency requires a thorough understanding of the insurgents' motives and sources of support. Clear political aims must guide military action if a counterinsurgency is to be successful and prepare a lasting reconciliation within a deeply fragmented society. The most successful counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the United States was the one against Philippine insurgents following the Spanish-American War. But even more instructive than successful counterinsurgencies are the persistent patterns of errors revealed by Joes's comparative study. Instances include the indiscriminate destructiveness displayed by the Japanese in China and the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the torture of suspected Muslim terrorists by members of the French Army in Algeria. Joes's comprehensive twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to the U.S. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible. Providing valuable insights into a world of conflict, Resisting Rebellion is a thorough and readable exploration of successes and failures in counterinsurgency's long history and a strategy for the future.

Modern Warfare

Modern Warfare PDF Author: Roger Trinquier
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 142891689X
Category : France
Languages : en
Pages : 131

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Book Description


Conflict of Myths

Conflict of Myths PDF Author: Larry E. Cable
Publisher: NYU Press
ISBN: 9780814714096
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 322

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Book Description
"Conflict of Myths is an in-depth devastating critique of how the U.S. government and its military services approached and misconceived the problems of guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency conflict in general, and in Vietnam in particular. It is also a first-rate overview built on original sources of how military institutions make and revise strategic doctrine. Finally, it is a concise treatment of the nature of pre-Vietnam, twentieth-century low-intensity military conflict which will be a useful starting point for both scholars and practitioners interested in the subject." —David A. Rosenberg,Department of Strategy,Naval War College "This brilliant new book offers a plausible explanation for American military strategy in Vietnam, particularly the bombing efforts along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Rolling Thunder Campaign in North Vietnam and explains why we trained, structured, and equipped the South Vietnamese Army in the American image. Cable offers not only solid research, but also considerable insight and a marvelous writing style. It is most encouraging to find a scholar concerned with national security affairs who is willing to do solid research on a difficult subject. Cable has tackled a difficult, emotion-laden subject crucial to the most likely future conflicts that may draw American involvement. Must reading!" —Colonel Dennis Drew,Director, Airpower Research Institute,Air University

The Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency PDF Author: Karl Hack
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110708010X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 529

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Book Description
The first in-depth and multi-perspective study of anti-colonial resistance and counterinsurgency in the Malayan Emergency and its impact on Malaysia.