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Author: Đảng lao động Việt-Nam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
Author: Đảng lao động Việt-Nam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
Author: United States
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 428
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 416
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Legislative hearings
Languages : en
Pages : 1226
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Book Description
Author: Cheng Guan Ang
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136869743
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 210
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Book Description
Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.
Author: Jeffrey P. Kimball
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 392
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Book Description
"The new evidence uncovers a number of behind-the-scenes plays - such as Nixon's secret nuclear alert of October 1969 - and sheds more light on Nixon's goals in Vietnam and his and Kissinger's strategies of Vietnamization, the "China card," and "triangular diplomacy." The excerpted documents also reveal significant new information about the purposes of the linebacker bombings, Nixon's manipulation of the pow issue, and the conduct of the secret negotiations in Paris - as well as other key topics, events, and issues. All of these are effectively framed by Kimball, whose introductions to each document provide historical context."
Author: R. B. Smith
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0415542634
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
Written by the late Ralph Smith, a highly respected historian of Asia, this book examines the history of communist Indochina, from the foundation of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1929-30 to the end of the 1970s.
Author: Cheng Guan Ang
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134341296
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, tells the story of the war from the Tet offensive in 1968 up to the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the predominantly US-centric narratives of the war by placing the Vietnamese communists centre-stage in the story. It is a sequel to the author's Routledge Curzon book The Vietnam War From the Other Side, which covers the period 1962-68.
Author: David L. Anderson
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231134800
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 484
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Book Description
America's experience in Vietnam continues to figure prominently in debates over strategy and defense and within the discourse on the identity of the United States as a nation. Through fifteen essays rooted in recent scholarship, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War is a chronological and critical collective history central to any discussion of America's interests abroad.David Anderson opens with an essay on the Vietnam War's major themes and enduring relevance. Mark Philip Bradley (University of Chicago) reexamines the rise of Vietnamese revolutionary nationalism and the Vietminh-led war against French colonialism. Richard Immerman (Temple University) revisits Eisenhower's and Kennedy's efforts at nation-building in South Vietnam. Gary Hess (Bowling Green State University) reviews America's military commitment under Kennedy and Johnson, and Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers University) investigates the motivations behind Johnson's escalation of force. Robert McMahon (Ohio State University) focuses on the pivotal period before and after the Tet Offensive, and Jeffrey Kimball (Miami University) makes sense of Nixon's paradoxical decision to end U.S. intervention while pursuing a destructive air war. John Prados (National Security Archive) and Eric Bergerud (Naval Postgraduate School) devote their essays to America's military strategy. Helen Anderson (California State University, Monterey Bay) and Robert Brigham (Vassar College) explore the war's impact on Vietnamese women and urban culture. Melvin Small (Wayne State University) recounts the domestic tensions created by America's involvement in Vietnam, and Kenton Clymer (Northern Illinois University) follows the spread of the war to Laos and Cambodia. Concluding essays by Robert Schulzinger (University of Colorado) and George Herring (University of Kentucky) trace the legacy of the war within Vietnamese and American contexts and diagnose the symptoms of the "Vietnam Syndrome" evident in later U.S. foreign policy debat.
Author: William Burr
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700620826
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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Book Description
In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for “tactical” nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a “special reminder” of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a “long-route” policy of providing Saigon with a “decent chance” of survival for a “decent interval” after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to unravel this intricate story of the October 1969 nuclear alert. They place it in the context of nuclear threat making and coercive diplomacy since 1945, the culture of the Bomb, intra-governmental dissent, domestic political pressures, the international “nuclear taboo,” and Vietnamese and Soviet actions and policies. It is a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.
