Corporate Risk Management, Product Market Competition, and Disclosure PDF Download
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Author: Daniel Hoang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.
Author: Daniel Hoang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
This paper studies the effects of hedge disclosure requirements on corporate risk management and product market competition. The analysis is based on a model of market entry and shows that to prevent entry incumbent firms engage in risk management when these activities remain unobserved by outsiders. In the resulting equilibrium, financial markets are well informed and entry is efficient. However, potential attempts for more transparency by additional disclosure requirements introduce a commitment device that provides incumbents with incentives to distort risk management activities thereby influencing entrant beliefs. In equilibrium, firms engage in significant risk-taking. This behavior limits entry and adversely affects the nature of competition in industries.
Author: M. V. Shivaani
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9811381410
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Book Description
This book proposes three normative frameworks pertaining to risk-measurement, disclosure and governance using expert opinion and data from the top 429 non-financial companies (of the NIFTY 500 index) over a 10-year period. The book offers a novel contribution to the global literature on disclosure quality by presenting a composite measure of the quality as well as quantity of risk disclosures. Focusing on the quality of risk disclosures and risk governance structures, and using sophisticated methodology to tackle the issue of endogeneity, the book explores the important yet uncharted confluence of accounting information, risk and corporate governance. It addresses the interplay between three facets of risk, and is corroborated by practitioners’ perspectives as well as case studies. It is an excellent resource for practitioners, professionals and policy-makers, in addition to researchers working on the topic.
Author: Hussein Ali Ahmad Abdoh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital assets pricing model
Languages : en
Pages : 115
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Book Description
Author: Harry DeAngelo
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601982046
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 215
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Book Description
Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.
Author: Manuel Ammann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Sikandar Ali Qalati
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811270287
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1185
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Book Description
This book mainly focuses on the research fields of Economic Management and Big Data Applications, specifically on the combination of the two. It covers all the excellent papers presented in the 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Big Data Application (ICEMBDA 2022), and aims to provide a solid reference for experts and scholars engaged in the fields of economics, management science, data modeling and cloud computing, to share typical cases, scientific methods, cutting-edge technologies and novel insights. In this age of data, the book initiated by the researchers and analysts from various related disciplines will provide more knowledge, technical support and directional guidance to promote the development and upgrading of research in management science and economic research.
Author: Jennifer Jane Baggs
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780662443018
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
"Economists have long held the belief that competition improves efficiency. One of the mechanisms suggested is that product market competition alleviates agency costs, which in turn many enable firms to induce higher effort and greater efficiency from their managers. In this way, competition mitigates what Leibenstein (1966) called 'X-inefficiencies.' Despite growing interest, an unambiguous theoretical formulation for this 'vague suspicion' has proved difficult to obtain. In this paper we examine the impact of competition on efficiency both theoretically and empirically. The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that product market competition can have a direct, and ambiguously positive effect on managerial incentives."--Unedited text from document.
Author: Rui Zhu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 236
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Book Description
This dissertation addresses issues in corporate risk management. Part I examines the determinants for corporate decisions to commodity hedge and to the extent of hedging. Chapter 1 discusses prior literature, including theory and empirical evidence on corporate risk management. It provides the background to support the empirical analyses of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 examines corporate decisions to commodity hedge. I find that firms are more likely to hedge when they are big, have risk management department set up and have more of their competitors hedge. Chapter 3 investigates what determines the extent of hedging conditional on hedging decisions and the cross-sectional and time series deviation of the hedge ratio. I find that firms tend to hedge less when they have younger CEOs and have more options in their compensation plan. I also find that when determining the hedge ratio, firms with young CEOs and higher option compensation tend to respond to past commodity price growth and to deviate from industry average. Part II investigates the relationship between corporate risk management and product market competition. Chapter 4 examines the different product market performance for firms with different hedging polices after commodity price shocks. I find that unhedged firms which are ex ante financially constrained lose market share and experience a decreased profitability during and after commodity price shocks. Chapter 5 examines whether the loss of unhedged constrained firms in product market is driven by the competitors. I find that firms with financial advantages--unconstrained hedged firms--tend to increase advertising expenditures and decrease price-cost-margins during negative commodity shocks, indicating that the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is due to increased competition in the product market. Chapter 6 examines whether corporate risk management affects the likelihood of firms exiting the market. I find that constrained unhedged firms are 6% more likely to exit the market than their unconstrained hedged rivals and the effects are stronger in concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion.
Author: Youli Zou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
This study provides evidence that hedge accounting information under SFAS No. 133 is related to rivals' entry decisions. Using detailed U.S. airline-industry data, I find that potential entrants are less likely to enter routes in which incumbents report higher accumulated other comprehensive income from fuel hedging, an indication of lower future production costs of the incumbents. This relation is stronger when incumbents have more annual report disclosures regarding their fuel hedging, and after SFAS No. 161, a systematic increase in risk management disclosure requirements is implemented. The findings accord with the notion that accounting information and disclosure are relevant to product-market competition, contributing to the financial reporting relevance and the proprietary costs literature.
Author: Benjamin M. Friedman
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226264238
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 404
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Book Description
The research reported in this volume represents the second stage of a wide-ranging National Bureau of Economic Research effort to investigate "The Changing Role of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation." The first group of studies sponsored under this project, which have been published individually and summarized in a 1982 volume bearing the same title (Friedman 1982), addressed several key issues relevant to corporate sector behavior along with such other aspects of the evolving financial underpinnings of U.S. capital formation as household saving incentives, international capital flows, and government debt management. In the project's second series of studies, presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research conference in January 1983 and published here for the first time along with commentaries from that conference, the central focus is the financial side of capital formation undertaken by the U.S. corporate business sector. At the same time, because corporations' securities must be held, a parallel focus is on the behavior of the markets that price these claims.
