Corporate Governance and the Effects of Ownership Structure on the Financial Performance of the American Healthcare Industry PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Corporate Governance and the Effects of Ownership Structure on the Financial Performance of the American Healthcare Industry PDF full book. Access full book title Corporate Governance and the Effects of Ownership Structure on the Financial Performance of the American Healthcare Industry by Carol Kheir Abi-Habib. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Carol Kheir Abi-Habib
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Get Book Here
Book Description
Corporate governance is becoming a subject of great concern, not only for financ ial and economic analysts, but also for academics, investors, managers and any o ther group that is influenced by what goes in inside the world of corporations. Ownership structure under the different systems of corporate governance is one m ajor aspect of the debate. Many literatures have been written on the subject but no clear patters are yet defined. This study has examined empirically the relationship between ownership structure and the financial performance of firms on the healthcare sector in the U.S mark et. The results showed: - A positive relationship between the percentage of share held by institutional shareholders and ROE. - A negative relationship between the number of outsiders and ROE - Having the CEO as the major shareholder has a negative effect on ROE - No relation between any of the corporate governance figures used and instituti onal ownership and ROA. - No relation between any the corporate governance figures used and institutiona l ownership and ROC. - The return on stock price is affected positively in the short run only by the percentage of the shares held by the institutional shareholders. - The number of outsiders and insiders and the relation CEO/chairman in the comp any as zero effect neither in the short run nor in the long run on the stock pri ce of that company.
Author: Carol Kheir Abi-Habib
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Get Book Here
Book Description
Corporate governance is becoming a subject of great concern, not only for financ ial and economic analysts, but also for academics, investors, managers and any o ther group that is influenced by what goes in inside the world of corporations. Ownership structure under the different systems of corporate governance is one m ajor aspect of the debate. Many literatures have been written on the subject but no clear patters are yet defined. This study has examined empirically the relationship between ownership structure and the financial performance of firms on the healthcare sector in the U.S mark et. The results showed: - A positive relationship between the percentage of share held by institutional shareholders and ROE. - A negative relationship between the number of outsiders and ROE - Having the CEO as the major shareholder has a negative effect on ROE - No relation between any of the corporate governance figures used and instituti onal ownership and ROA. - No relation between any the corporate governance figures used and institutiona l ownership and ROC. - The return on stock price is affected positively in the short run only by the percentage of the shares held by the institutional shareholders. - The number of outsiders and insiders and the relation CEO/chairman in the comp any as zero effect neither in the short run nor in the long run on the stock pri ce of that company.
Author: Jihane Nicolas Assaf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
Get Book Here
Book Description
Corporate Governance is currently a subject of great international concern and debate. Ownership structure is one major aspect of it that varies widely among d ifferent systems. Many literatures have been written on the subject but academics still a rgue that there is a tradeoff between large ownership concentration and liquidity. This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance. The variables used to represent ownership structure in te rms of ownership concentration and shareholders' identity are: Percentage of shares hel d by insiders and 5% owners, Percentage of shares held by institutions, Percentage of shares held by the major shareholder, four dummy variables indicating whether the major shareholder is an institution, a beneficial owner, the CEO, or an insider other than the CEO. Other control variables, which are the size of the firm, debt- to- equity r atio, and capital intensity, are used in order to capture the variability of firms' charac teristics and obtain a solid regression model. Financial performance is represented by both accounting and financial measures, which are: ROA, Market to Book Ratio, and Returns on Stocks on both the short and long- run. This study results in: * A positive relationship exists between the Percentage of Shares Held by Institutions & Mutual Funds Owners and ROA. * Having an insider as the major shareholder affects positively ROA. * Having the COE as the major shareholder has a positive impact on the Market To Book Ratio. * A positive relationship exists between the Percentage of Shares Held by Institutions & Mutual Funds Owners and the Five- Year Returns on Stocks. * A positive relationship exists between the Percentage of Shares Held by Insiders & 5% Owners and the Five- Year Returns on Stocks. * A negative relationship exists between the Number of Ownership Blocks exceeding 5% and The Five- Year Returns on Stocks. * Having an institution as the major shareholder affects negatively the Five-Yea r Returns on Stocks.
Author: Hoang N. Pham
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000540278
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 190
Get Book Here
Book Description
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.
Author: Institute of Medicine
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309036437
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 580
Get Book Here
Book Description
"[This book is] the most authoritative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of recent trends toward the commercialization of health care," says Robert Pear of The New York Times. This major study by the Institute of Medicine examines virtually all aspects of for-profit health care in the United States, including the quality and availability of health care, the cost of medical care, access to financial capital, implications for education and research, and the fiduciary role of the physician. In addition to the report, the book contains 15 papers by experts in the field of for-profit health care covering a broad range of topicsâ€"from trends in the growth of major investor-owned hospital companies to the ethical issues in for-profit health care. "The report makes a lasting contribution to the health policy literature." â€"Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law.
Author: Donald H. Chew
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 9780231519984
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 388
Get Book Here
Book Description
Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of the U.S. governance system in achieving that end. Essays address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, transferable stock options, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the "right" investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's "earnings game." Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.
Author: Kathryn J. Chang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this dissertation, I attempt to study the equilibrium behaviors of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in a monopolistic competitive market, and to empirically test whether there is a measurable difference in board governance practices and strategic cost management approach across hospital ownership types. Chapter 1 offers a brief introduction to three manuscripts that analytically and empirically examine the relationship between ownership forms and hospital behaviors pertaining to board governance and strategic cost management. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model to explain the equilibrium behavior and outcome of nonprofit hospitals as compared to for-profit hospitals in a monopolistic competitive market. I find that nonprofit hospitals tend to maximize quantity of services by offering a broad range of services at relatively low prices, irrespective of the ability of these hospitals to obtain additional funds and the size of the subsidy. However, subsidized hospitals are able to further lower price to attract more patients but still manage to break even. Moreover, nonprofit hospitals are relatively more efficient by maximizing economic welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus) and operating at economies of scale. Such finding contradicts the conventional view that for-profit is a more efficient type of ownership form (Clarkson, 1972; Clark, 1980; Cutler and Horwitz, 2000) but is consistent with empirical findings that predominantly favor nonprofit hospitals (Rosenau 2003; Rosenau and Linder 2003; Schlesinger and Gray 2006). Therefore, this paper provides theoretical explanation for the performance paradox of nonprofit hospital. Three propositions derived from the model can be further developed into testable hypotheses for future empirical research. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the relationship between board / CEO turnover and hospital performance, as well as the incremental effects of ownership type on hospital board governance practices. It develops the hypotheses that claim the substandard performance increases board / CEO turnover and the propensity of boards using certain performance measures is different between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Departing from prior studies, this paper applies factor analysis to examine the usefulness of multiple financial and nonfinancial performance measures in estimating the determinants and factors leading to board / CEO turnover. Using a sample from California short-term general, acute care hospitals, I find that multiple financial and nonfinancial performance measures are useful accounting signals of board governance practices. Moreover, the sensitivity of boards toward certain performance measures is affected by hospital ownership status only in the CEO replacement decision. Chapter 4 empirically examines the influence of ownership on strategic cost management (SCM) and its performance consequences in the health care industry. Drawing upon the property rights theory and prior accounting literature, it develops the hypotheses that predict the ownership type would affect the extent to which the hospital strategically manages revenues and costs of operation, leading to improvement in financial performance. The results suggest that the ownership type does play a significant role in the choice of SCM strategies along the dimension of revenue-enhancing and cost reduction across a sample of U.S. hospitals. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the association between the extensive use of SCM strategy and hospital financial performance is a function of the "match" between SCM use and a hospital's ownership type, operating characteristic and market environment.
Author: Dennis D. Pointer
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0787976504
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 207
Get Book Here
Book Description
"Finally! The book that all health care board members needed but were afraid to ask for! Those dark days of staring at incomprehensible numbers during board meetings, of nervous nodding when their financially-literate brethren make comments or ask questions, of voting on things that they do not understand are gone! This book is long overdue and should be read by every trustee who is not a finance professional." --James E. Orlikoff, president, Orlikoff & Associates, Inc. and executive director, American Governance & Leadership Group Accounting for $1.4 trillion in expenditures (13.7 percent of gross domestic product), health care is one of the nation's largest and fastest growing industries. This concise, expertly written primer on health care organization finance is a nuts and bolts guide to what has become every hospital's most sensitive topic. Health care organization board members must possess basic financial competence to govern effectively. This book will help them acquire, easily and painlessly, the basic financial literacy essential for discharging their roles and fulfilling their fiduciary duties.
Author: Michel Aglietta
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1845425472
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Get Book Here
Book Description
Recent corporate governance scandals have brought to the fore the inherent contradictions of a capitalism dominated by financial markets. This challenging book by Michel Aglietta and Antoine Reberioux argues that capitalism's basic premise - that companies must be managed in the sole interest of their shareholders - is incongruent with the current environment of liquid markets, profit-hungry investors and chronic financial instability.
Author: Lee-Ming Tan
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9811081476
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book is a compilation of the best papers presented at the 2017 installment of the Asia-Pacific Conference on Economics & Finance (APEF), which is held annually in Singapore. With a great number of submissions, it presents the latest research findings in economics and finance and discusses relevant issues in today's world. The book is a useful resource for readers who want access to economics, finance and business research focusing on the Asia-Pacific region.
Author: Henry Hansmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Get Book Here
Book Description
Despite the extensive attention paid to corporate governance in the literature of both law and economics in recent years, empirical work to date has largely failed to establish a link between formal governance structures and economic performance. In this paper, we explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and economic performance in a setting that is, in important respects, more favorable than the publicly-traded U.S. business corporations that are the typical focus of previous research. We work with a rich data set comprising 121 Danish industrial foundations, which are industrial companies controlled by autonomous nonprofit foundations. These industrial foundations have several important advantages as subjects of study. First, by conventional measures, the industrial companies perform, on average, as efficiently as their investor-owned counterparts - a remarkable fact, given their ownership structure. Second, because the management of the companies is ultimately in the hands of a self-perpetuating board of directors that is free of control by outside owners, the impact of the firm's internal governance structure on managerial decision-making, and hence on company performance, should be both more intense and more easily isolated than in conventional investor-owned firms. Third, the industrial foundations display broader variance in internal governance structures than do U.S. business corporations.We focus in particular on a composite structural factor we term “managerial distance.” We interpret this as a measure of the clarity and objectivity with which a firm's top managers are induced to focus on the operating company's profitability. More particularly, managerial distance seems best interpreted as a factor, or aggregate of component factors, that put the firm's top managers in the position of “virtual owners,” in the sense that the information and decisions facing the managers are framed for them in roughly the way they would be framed for true owners of the firm. Our empirical analysis shows a positive, significant, and robust association between managerial distance and company economic performance. The findings appear to illuminate not just foundation governance, but corporate governance more generally.
