Core-Pricing in Large Multi-Object Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Andor Goetzendorff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Motivated by markets for television advertising time-slots, we introduce a new combinatorial auction format, including a general method for approximating core-selecting payments for hard problems. Given the size and complexity of ad markets in practice, an enumerative XOR bidding language (widely discussed in the literature and used in recent government spectrum auctions) grows too quickly to be practical. We therefore propose a compact bidding language for coverage or demographic reach, and investigate the resulting winner determination (a form of multi-knapsack problem) using numerical experiments. For realistic instances of the problem, very good solutions can be found relatively quickly, though closing the integrality gap to find marginally better solutions or prove optimality can take a prohibitively large amount of time. Our subsequent adaptation of the core-selecting payment technique to this environment of nearly-optimal optimization results is a new, practically viable paradigm by which competitive market outcomes can be achieved despite computational limitations.
Author: Andor Goetzendorff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Motivated by markets for television advertising time-slots, we introduce a new combinatorial auction format, including a general method for approximating core-selecting payments for hard problems. Given the size and complexity of ad markets in practice, an enumerative XOR bidding language (widely discussed in the literature and used in recent government spectrum auctions) grows too quickly to be practical. We therefore propose a compact bidding language for coverage or demographic reach, and investigate the resulting winner determination (a form of multi-knapsack problem) using numerical experiments. For realistic instances of the problem, very good solutions can be found relatively quickly, though closing the integrality gap to find marginally better solutions or prove optimality can take a prohibitively large amount of time. Our subsequent adaptation of the core-selecting payment technique to this environment of nearly-optimal optimization results is a new, practically viable paradigm by which competitive market outcomes can be achieved despite computational limitations.
Author: Sascha Michael Schweitzer
Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing
ISBN: 3866449046
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
This book presents two experimental studies that deal with the comparison of multi-item auction designs for two specific applications: the sale of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum rights in Europe, and the sale of emissions permits in Australia. In order to tackle the complexity of these experiments, a cognitively based toolkit is proposed, including modularized video instructions, comprehension tests, a learning platform, a graphical one-screen user interface, and comprehension-based group matching.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135346
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 935
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Book Description
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316800245
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191534722
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Book Description
Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.
Author: Srobonti Chattopadhyay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351271067
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
