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Author: Garance Genicot
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Garance Genicot
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: David W. Barnes
Publisher: West Academic Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 146
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Book Description
Designed to integrate economic principles into a traditional contracts course. The cases and materials consider reasons why some contracts should not be enforced, where enforcement might lead to inefficient results due to externalities, mistake, or lack of capacity or consideration. Introduces the theory of efficient breach and applying that theory to issues of impracticability and impossibility. Considers various permutations of the traditional remedies for breach and the limitations on recovery of damages. The final section considers duress and unconscionability and offers economic rationales for not enforcing agreements into which parties have voluntarily entered.
Author: Claudia M. Landeo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Communication
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
"This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Author: Oliver E Williamson
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9813202076
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 220
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Book Description
This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.
Author: Petra Nieken
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project which has an external effect on player B. Yet, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A's self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Yet, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in the case of ultimatum game bargaining as well as in the case of unstructured bargaining with free-form communication.
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025768
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 746
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Book Description
A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author: Lyn Kim Lan Tjon Soei Len
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 193
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Book Description
Author: Eric A. Posner
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674067630
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 383
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Book Description
Exchange of goods and ideas among nations, cross-border pollution, global warming, and international crime pose formidable questions for international law. Two respected scholars provide an intellectual framework for assessing these problems from a rational choice perspective and describe conditions under which international law succeeds or fails.
Author: Ilya R. Segal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Exclusive contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 77
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Book Description
Author: Harvey S. James
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Book Description
Research on contracting and organisational economics is progressing at a rapid pace. Nevertheless, what new ideas are needed in order to advance the frontiers of contracting and organisations research in ways that prove beneficial to society? This new book brings together scholars from around the world who have new ideas on the economics of contracts and organisations, otherwise known as transaction cost economics. The book is divided into three main sections. The first section presents ideas for improving the theoretical and empirical research in transaction cost economics. The second section shows how transaction cost economics informs on two important business issues -- corporate contracting and information technology (IT) operations. The third section presents alternative frameworks for examining contracting, organisational, and regulatory problems.
