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Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9789027252050
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 542
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Book Description
What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9789027252050
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 542
Get Book Here
Book Description
What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Author: Manuel Bremer
Publisher: Peter Lang
ISBN: 9783631578766
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
Conceptual atomism claims that most concepts cannot be decomposed into features, so that the conjunction of the features is equivalent to the concept in question. Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism. Justificationist semantics in its pure form, therefore, has to be wrong. Nevertheless, its epistemological approach to questions of evaluations and semantic rules could still stand. The main question is how conceptual atomism can be combined with some justificationist ideas. This new synthesis centres on the representational theory of mind and 'internalist' semantics, but ties these to ideas which stress the epistemic commitments that accompany successful assertions.
Author: Susan Schneider
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262015579
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Preface p. ix 1 Introduction p. 1 2 The Central System as a Computational Engine p. 27 3 Jerry Fodor's Globality Challenge to the Computational Theory of Mind Kirk Ludwig p. 65 4 What LOT's Mental States Cannot Be: Ruling out Alternative Conceptions p. 91 5 Mental Symbols p. 111 6 Idiosyncratic Minds Think Alike: Modes of Presentation Reconsidered p. 135 7 Concepts: A Pragmatist Theory p. 159 8 Solving the Frege Cases p. 183 9 Conclusion p. 229 References p. 233 Index p. 249.
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John-Michael Kuczynski
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 734
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Book Description
Papers on the philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Topics covered include probabilistic causation, the nature of formal truth, the role of language in thought, conceptual atomism, simulated vs. actual intelligence, and the nature of emotion.
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John-Michael Kuczynski
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 825
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Book Description
Philosophy is the science of the science and therefore the analysis of the assumptions underlying empirical inquiry. Given that these assumptions cannot possibly be examined or even identified on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophy is a non-empirical discipline. And given that our linguistic and cultural practices cannot possibly be examined or even identified except on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophical questions are not linguistic questions and do not otherwise concern our conventions or our cultural practices. This entails that philosophical truths are not tautologous or otherwise trivial. It also entails that empiricism is false and, therefore, that Platonism is correct. Given a clear understanding of why Platonism is correct and of what this implies, a number of shibboleths of contemporary analytic philosophy are speedily demolished and are no less speedily replaced with independently corroborated and intuitively plausible alternatives. New answers are given to age-old questions concerning scientific explanation, causal and logical dependence, linguistic meaning, personal identity, the structure of the psyche, and the nature of personal responsibility. Existing answers to these question are thoroughly considered and duly extended, modified, or replaced. Every technical term is defined; every philosophy-specific concept is explained; and the positions defended are consistent with commonsense, so far as their being consistent with the relevant data allows them to be. Therefore, this book is intelligible to philosophically minded laymen. At the same time, it is appropriate for advanced scholars, given that it defends original viewpoints and given also that, even though it discusses old viewpoints, it does so in new ways. Because it is clearly written, it is intelligible to neophytes; but it is not an introductory text and it is not a textbook. There are two appendices: the first, a thorough exposition of the rudiments of formal logic, along with the conceptual underpinnings of that discipline; the second, a definition and analytic discussion of each technical term that occurs in the text.
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John-Michael Kuczynski
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 1003
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Book Description
A comprehensive treatise on analytic philosophy, with special attention paid to the theoretical basis of psychopathology.
Author: David Skrbina
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252114
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 420
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Book Description
Panpsychism is the view that all things, living and nonliving, possess some mind like quality. It stands in sharp contrast to the traditional notion of mind as the property of humans and (perhaps) a few select 'higher animals'. Though surprising at first glance, panpsychism has a long and noble history in both Western and Eastern thought. Overlooked by analytical, materialist philosophy for most of the 20th century, it is now experiencing a renaissance of sorts in several areas of inquiry. A number of recent books including Skrbina's Panpsychism in the West (2005) and Strawson et al's Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2006) have established panpsychism as respectable and viable. Mind That Abides builds on these works. It takes panpsychism to be a plausible theory of mind and then moves forward to work out the philosophical, psychological and ethical implications. With 17 contributors from a variety of fields, this book promises to mark a wholesale change in our philosophical outlook. (Series A)
Author: Bruno Mölder
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252165
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 309
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Book Description
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Molder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness perception and the awareness of one s own mental states in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)"
Author: Mark Sprevak
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317286723
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 527
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Book Description
Computational approaches dominate contemporary cognitive science, promising a unified, scientific explanation of how the mind works. However, computational approaches raise major philosophical and scientific questions. In what sense is the mind computational? How do computational approaches explain perception, learning, and decision making? What kinds of challenges should computational approaches overcome to advance our understanding of mind, brain, and behaviour? The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind is an outstanding overview and exploration of these issues and the first philosophical collection of its kind. Comprising thirty-five chapters by an international team of contributors from different disciplines, the Handbook is organised into four parts: History and future prospects of computational approaches Types of computational approach Foundations and challenges of computational approaches Applications to specific parts of psychology. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of science, The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind will also be of interest to those studying computational models in related subjects such as psychology, neuroscience, and computer science.
Author: István Czigler
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9027252149
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
Perceptual experience emerges from neural computations. "Unconscious Memory Representations in Perception "focuses on the role of implicit (non-conscious) memories in processing sensory information. Making sense of the wealth of information arriving at our senses requires implicit memories, which represent environmental regularities, contingencies of the sensory input, as well as general contextual knowledge. Recent findings and theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience provided new insights into the structure and contents of implicit memory representations. The chapters of this book examine implicit memories both in relatively simple situations, such as perceiving auditory and visual objects, as well as in high?level cognitive functions, such as speech and music perception and aesthetic experience. By nature, implicit memories cannot be directly studied with behavioral methods. Therefore, a large part of the evidence reviewed was obtained in neuroscientific studies. Readers with limited experience in neuroscience will find information about the most commonly used techniques in the appendix of this volume. (Series B)
