Author: General Giulio Douhet
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782898522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 620
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Book Description
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
Author: J. Taylor Sink
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428992774
Category : Air warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 70
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Book Description
Author: Clint Hinote
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478296508
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
The Air Force's master tenet of centralized control, decentralized execution is in danger of becoming dogma. Airmen have difficulty communicating the meaning of this phrase in a joint setting. This is partially due to our limited understanding of its history and the imprecise meaning of the words involved. Furthermore, the irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (and the ongoing service debates in the Pacific) have demonstrated the need for a deeper understanding of this master tenet to advocate effectively for airpower solutions. We must get this right, as it is critical to maximizing airpower's potential. Getting it right, however, requires moving beyond sound bites and bumper stickers.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428913351
Category : Generals
Languages : en
Pages : 612
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Book Description
General Kenney Reports is a classic account of a combat commander in action. General George Churchill Kenney arrived in the South- west Pacific theater in August 1942 to find that his command, if not in a shambles, was in dire straits. The theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, had no confidence in his air element. Kenney quickly changed this situation. He organized and energized the Fifth Air Force, bringing in operational commanders like Whitehead and Wurtsmith who knew how to run combat air forces. He fixed the logistical swamp, making supply and maintenance supportive of air operations, and encouraging mavericks such as Pappy Gunn to make new and innovative weapons and to explore new tactics in airpower application. The result was a disaster for the Japanese. Kenney's airmen used air power-particularly heavily armed B-25 Mitchell bombers used as commerce destroyers-to savage Japanese supply lines, destroying numerous ships and effectively isolating Japanese garrisons. The classic example of Kenney in action was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, which marked the attainment of complete Allied air dominance and supremacy over Japanese naval forces operating around New Guinea. In short, Kenney was a brilliant, innovative airman, who drew on his own extensive flying experiences to inform his decision-making. General Kenney Reports is a book that has withstood the test of time, and which should be on the shelf of every airman.
Author: Francisco M. Gallei
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Aeronautics, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 421
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Book Description
"To paraphrase Martin van Creveld, commanding and controlling forces has been around since time immemorial and a failure to have effective command and control is 'to court disaster.' It is no difference for warfare in the third domain. Effective command and control of air forces improves a commander's ability to make and execute good decisions in a timely manner. It provides unity of effort, massing of forces as necessary, and flexibility to react to battlefield dynamics. Nations, and specifically their military services, continuously evaluate their environment and make strategic decisions regarding force composition. In the next decade, the United States Air Force (USAF) will face many challenges. Once is ensuring an appropriate command and control system for a changing and evolving Air Force. Command and control of air forces is seldom thought of or discussed until needed, and then usually as an afterthought. Unlike aircraft, which are the highly visible symbols of airpower, command and control is generally unseen. It operates in the background, ignored until it is unavailable or fails ... In the current fiscal environment, a mission not as 'glamorous' as flying is easily neglected in search for 'savings.' History suggests this would be inadvisable -- command and control is airpower's sinew. Without it the structure has no connectivity. Discussions regarding air forces and their successes and failures generally revolve around a myriad of other topics such as strategy, doctrine, battles, aircraft quality, or production rates. A holistic examination of effective command and control of air forces is missing from the literature. No comparative historical studies exist examining how air forces developed command and control systems. How does an air force integrate organization, processes, and technology into a command and control construct? ... this study compares and contrasts three national (British, American, and German) approaches to command and control of airpower through World War II. It examines the commonalities and differences between the countries and their unique approaches to the problem of commanding and controlling air forces. It will also hopefully offer insights into the larger question of how national air forces often develop along different lines"--Pages 4-5.
Author: J. Ian Chambers
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781479201747
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
The Luftwaffe's defeat of Allied airpower in the Kasserine Pass in 1943 imprinted the principle of mass upon the US Air Force's organizational psyche. The then Army Air Corps recognized the necessity of consolidating airpower under the command and control of a single airman to mass airpower's effects. This belief in centralized control of airpower became a central reason for the creation of an independent Air Force in 1947. The linkage between centralized control and the origin of the Air Force plays a significant role in Air Force culture. This study examines the Air Force's ability to apply the centralized control approach to irregular warfare. The growing focus and literature on the differences between traditional warfare and irregular warfare challenge the US Air Force's adherence to centralized control. This study asks, “Can the Air Force's current, traditional command and control structure integrate airpower effectively into irregular warfare (IW) operations?” This research question leads to a review of the irregular warfare theory, organizational theory, and application of these theories in the current context to determine the effectiveness of centralized control in irregular warfare. The study compares the requirements identified by theory against the Air Force's command and control structure, the Theater Air Control System (TACS). Subsequent chapters discuss the TACS performance in contemporary IW environments. The discussion leads to limitations of the TACS in irregular warfare and potential improvements.
Author: Gregory S. Marzolf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Air power
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
"Recent experiences in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted the need for adaptable and tailorable airpower command and control (C2) systems that can better serve the joint force across the entire range of operations. Though the Air Force has done a good job adapting the existing C2 system to the task, at times using a variety of control frameworks, it has not yet looked at future C2 requirements holistically in order to create a "toolbox of capabilities" that avoids the need for poorly optimized piece-meal or work-around solutions. Simply stated, as battlefield dynamics change and technology moves forward, air employment and its associated C2 systems must also change to remain relevant. The inattention has resulted in obsolete elements of the Theater Air Command System, Air Operations Centers funded at 50 percent (or less), poor command relationships, and an unwieldy C2 structure that is difficult to tailor for today's fight. Here, decentralized ground operations are bypassing operational-level planning processes. This has created a large seam between air planning (that occurs centrally at the AOC, far removed from the battlefield) and ground planning that occurs at low-level tactical units (directly on the battlefield). The upshot is a perception that the Air Force is not there, or not fully committed to the joint fight. To help solve these problems, this study offers insights into the world of C2 by explaining that there are no "one size fits all" C2 systems. It stresses the importance of human relationships to build trust. It emphasizes the benefits of hierarchal over flat structures. And, it offers some suggestions (such as using mission-type orders) to help overcome bandwidth limitations and C2 vulnerabilities in order to create a more survivable C2 system. After this, the paper suggests that the Air Force's current "centralized control, decentralized execution" paradigm does not adequately represent airpower employment, and because of this, it redefines and offers a new C2 paradigm, "centralized command, adaptive control, decentralized execution." This paradigm better represents the future evolution and totality of airpower employment. In the end, the following suggestions are offered to make future airpower C2 better and more relevant. They include: 1) Adopt "Centralized Command, Adaptive Control, Decentralized Execution" as the AF's paradigm for airpower employment. 2) Develop more flexible/adaptable C2 solutions that provide the JFACC with a "toolbox of capabilities;" this not only includes fixing TACS, but also having structures/C2 elements that provide sufficient depth of control. 3) Consider adopting MTO as an over-arching C2 philosophy for AF base-line training. 4) Implement an Air Warfare Training Strategy. 5) Build strong habitual command relationships by avoiding overly flat C2 structures that increase span of control, increasing centralized decision-making, and allowing subordinates to drift. 6) Reduce CENTCOM's CFACC duties so they can focus exclusively on warfighting, not on other service-related matters that detract from the joint mission. 7) Build a deployable (or partly deployable) AOC capability. 8) Extend appropriate AF deployments to one-year. 9) Ensure forces train together before deploying into combat. And, 10) build a career track to help embolden AF warfighting culture."--Abstract from web site.
Author: Mark R. Heusinkveld
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781479195602
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Book Description
There has been much discussion about the best use of airpower in small wars, specifically with regard to current operations in Afghanistan. Coalition air forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom use the same command and control (C2) structures doctrinally established for all types of operations. The Air Force doctrine of centralized control and decentralized execution drives the makeup of C2 within the operation. Is there a better way to structure airpower in small wars? Although neither France nor the United States met their strategic objective, air operations by the French in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam provide contrasting models of C2 structures for a comparative case study. The French saw the importance of a decentralized model to maximize the support of ground troops. To use modern terminology, the French set up a joint task force in each geographic section of Algeria. Each geographic area had its own air command post collocated with the French Army command post within the region. The United States, on the other hand, centralized control of aircraft. United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine, in Vietnam, required that air assets be under the centralized control of a single air commander. Interservice rivalry heated this debate; the USAF was unwilling to allow anyone other than an air commander to control aircraft. The USAF argued that decentralization of airpower could easily have wasted the scarce air resources found in theater. However, it was centralized in name only. Aircraft were commanded and controlled under a variety of organizations to include, 7th Air Force, 13th Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US Embassy. Both operations provide insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of the air C2 structures. This monograph asks if the structures used by the air forces in these conflicts can provide lessons for the United States in small wars today. If current structures are not as effective or efficient, commanders can modify the structures, using the insights gained by this monograph, to provide better support to ground operations in today's small wars.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
The Air Force doctrinally advocates centralized command and control with decentralized execution as the best means to concentrate force on any facet of an enemy's power. Although there are historical examples of effective command and control that has been less centralized, Air Force views decentralization as the cause of inefficient and suboptimal use of air power. Trends in modern business, government, economics, science, and computer and communications systems suggest that it is appropriate to develop predominantly decentralized command and control methods to enhance the current doctrine. This study constructs a decentralized vision of command and control which, together with current centralized methods, provides theater air commanders with a full spectrum of options. Two broad-based tools assist the development of the expanded spectrum of command and control options. First, this study develops a conceptual framework describes eight interconnected subject areas to consider in describing a command and control system. Second, this study describes the new science of complexity theory which provides interdisciplinary viewpoints to assess and enhance the adaptability and responsiveness of command and control. Juxtaposing the conceptual framework and complexity theory shows numerous intuitive connections between the two tools. Using the conceptual framework, the study describes the current archetype of centralized command and control through an organization built around a theater air operations center. Then, using complexity theory and other related sources, the study constructs a predominantly decentralized command and control system characterized by a networked hierarchical organization.
Author: Tim Bonds
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Air power
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
The U.S. Air Force has faced significant challenges in its recent operations. Forces have been called into action around the globe on short timelines that allow for neither adequate training or planning, while Air Operations Centers providing theater command and control (C2) have been built on the fly as forces are deployed to each contingency. This paper describes the organization of the C2 force element supporting the Air Force component commander, presents comments and criticisms from senior commanders and top Department of Defense officials regarding the Air Force's ability to command and control airpower in recent operations, and describes new capabilities the theater C2 units need to employ aerospace forces to their greatest effect before and during theater combat operations. The authors find that C2 systems and procedures (1) should be designed as part of a comprehensive concept, (2) must be useful for the various training-related tasks, (3) allow for and facilitate continuous improvements, and (4) be thoroughly evaluated and practiced by the commander and staff.
