Coalition Formation and Social Choice PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Coalition Formation and Social Choice PDF full book. Access full book title Coalition Formation and Social Choice by Ad M.A. Van Deemen. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Ad M.A. Van Deemen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475725787
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Get Book Here
Book Description
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
Author: Ad M.A. Van Deemen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475725787
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Get Book Here
Book Description
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
Author: Felix Brandt
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316489752
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 553
Get Book Here
Book Description
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
Author: Debraj Ray
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019920795X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Get Book Here
Book Description
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Author: Sona Nadenichek Golder
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
ISBN: 0814210295
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Get Book Here
Book Description
Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored pre-electoral coalitions in favor of focusing on the government coalitions that form after parliamentary elections. Yet electoral coalitions are common, they affect electoral outcomes, and they have important implications for democratic policy-making itself. The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation by Sona Nadenichek Golder includes a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, statistical, and historical) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some instances but not in others. The results indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Ideologically polarized party systems and disproportional electoral rules in combination also increase the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. Golder links the analysis of pre-electoral coalition formation to the larger government coalition literature by showing that pre-electoral agreements increase (a) the likelihood that a party will enter government, (b) the ideological compatibility of governments, and (c) the speed with which governments take office. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy.
Author: John Von Neumann
Publisher: Diana
ISBN: 9785608789779
Category : Games & Activities
Languages : en
Pages : 660
Get Book Here
Book Description
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
Author: Robin Phinney
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107170362
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 203
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book develops a new theory of collaborative lobbying and influence to explain how antipoverty advocates gain influence in American social policymaking.
Author: H.A.M. Wilke
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080866786
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Get Book Here
Book Description
A comprehensive view of coalition formation is presented here. Each of the chapters gives a summary of theories and research findings in a specific field of interest, at various levels of human and primate organisation.
Author: Peter C. Fishburn
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400868335
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 277
Get Book Here
Book Description
One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is divided into three main parts: social choice between two alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions; simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Author: Jan van Leeuwen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540695060
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 955
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 33rd Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, SOFSEM 2007, held in Harrachov, Czech Republic in January 2007. The 69 revised full papers, presented together with 11 invited contributions were carefully reviewed and selected from 283 submissions. The papers were organized in four topical tracks.
Author: László Á. Kóczy
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319698419
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.
