Choosing how to Monitor a Competitor when Colluding PDF Download
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Author: William D. Drake
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price fixing
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: William D. Drake
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price fixing
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262343002
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 145
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Book Description
A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
Author: Charles J. Romeo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : American newspapers
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: Steven Van Uytsel
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1802203044
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
What is algorithmic collusion? This evaluative book provides an insight into tackling this important question for competition law, with contrasting critical perspectives, including theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal – the latter frequently from a comparative perspective. Bringing together scholarly discussion on algorithmic collusion, the book questions whether competition law is adeptly equipped to deal with its various facets.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428953302
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
Author: Antonio Estache
Publisher: CEPR
ISBN: 1907142355
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Book Description
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
Author: Richard W. Haynes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Forest management
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Author: Kokkoris, Ioannis
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1789903793
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 507
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Book Description
This incisive Research Handbook identifies and assesses the emerging trends in competition enforcement, investigating how such changes impact the enforcement approach of competition authorities and the behaviour of companies in an ever-evolving business and regulatory environment.
Author: Thomas Weck
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811279276
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 311
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Book Description
This book provides a comparative overview of the rules of EU, US, and Japanese law on com-petition. After an overview of their history and the underlying economic issues, it compares perspectives on cartels and other agreements restraining competition (ancillary agreements, R&D/specialization agreements, distribution agreements); single-firm conduct (abuse of dom-inant market power/monopolization); general procedural law and merger control, and state measures such as regulation and subsidies. In each case, the presentation of the legal system is supplemented by examples from the case law. With a focus on the protection of competition in digital markets, new regulatory approaches (e.g., the EU Digital Markets Act and comparable US regulatory initiatives) are evaluated and current legal developments in other jurisdictions are addressed.
Author: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262036932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 145
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Book Description
A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
