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Author: Olga Oliker
Publisher: RAND Corporation
ISBN: 9780833051684
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Book Description
Security force assistance is central to the counterinsurgency campaign of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome will hinge on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces.
Author: Olga Oliker
Publisher: RAND Corporation
ISBN: 9780833051684
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Book Description
Security force assistance is central to the counterinsurgency campaign of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome will hinge on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces.
Author: Terrence K. Kelly
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833052225
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 182
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Book Description
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time, documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan force from 2001 to 2009, and provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437986560
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 73
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Book Description
Author: United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160941382
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 284
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Book Description
Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: RAND Corporation
ISBN: 9780833049889
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
"Security in Afghanistan has historically required a combination of top-down efforts from the central government and bottom-up efforts from local communities. Since 2001, U.S. and broader international efforts have focused on establishing security solely from the top down through Afghan national security forces and other central government institutions. But local security forces are a critical complement to these efforts, especially in rural areas of the country. The Afghan government and NATO forces need to move quickly to establish a more-effective bottom-up strategy to complement top-down efforts by better leveraging local communities. The Afghan government can work with existing community structures that oppose insurgents to establish village-level policing entities, such as arbakai and chalweshtai, with support from NATO. Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects and can facilitate mobilization of the population against insurgents. This analysis documents lessons about the viability of establishing local security in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies."--P. [4] of cover.
Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833045202
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 176
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Book Description
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Author: Austin Long
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833087592
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 122
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Book Description
This report summarizes key special operations forces (SOF) partnering practices and presents findings from case studies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia. It also identifies best practices to benefit development of SOF in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Author: Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (U.S.)
Publisher: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions
ISBN: 9780160948312
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 277
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Book Description
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
Author: Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Afghanistan
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This thesis evaluates the viability of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as a strategy to achieve the US objectives of preserving the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and denying safe-haven to transnational terrorists. The development of the civil state and the enabling of security forces are two simultaneous and mutually supporting processes, each of which are necessary for the future of Afghanistan. This thesis hypothesizes that the process of Building Partner Capacity is the key to achieving the security dimension of this goal. Early success in the 2001 intervention was a direct product of working by, with and through Afghan forces. By contrast, the failures of the subsequent era stemmed from attempts to unilaterally achieve security, while under-supporting true partner capacity building. Although central to success, BPC has only recently been prioritized, beginning in the 2014 shift towards an advisory mission, and away from Counter-Insurgency led by international troops. Final resolution of the conflict will require a diplomatic process between the Afghan government and insurgent forces. However, groups like the Taliban enjoy continued sustainment from Pakistan and ties of alliance with terror groups like al-Qaeda. At present, the Taliban believe total military victory to be possible and will not negotiate in good-faith. Before the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are made sustainable, no compromise can ensure Afghanistan does not regress again into a safe-haven for transnational terrorists. With the ideal operational footprint and consistent prioritization of resources, Afghan security capacity can be made sustainable. Already, forces like the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) have been built up into highly credible partners. Technically sophisticated assets like Afghan military aviation have also enjoyed steady growth while proving decisive on the battlefield. Problems in wider conventional units persist, but strategies like the newly formed Territorial Force represent a promising evolution for providing local holding forces. If the US can politically sustain its partnership with the Afghan state, then BPC constitutes the most constructive form of pursuing the security-half of the nation-building whole. As it stands, BPC represents a progressive break in the models of the past, a lower-footprint means of sustaining engagement, and a tangible way of empowering the only actors capable of providing lasting security, the Afghans themselves.
Author: Craig Whitlock
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1982159014
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 384
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Book Description
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.
