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Author: Cailin Slattery
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
In the U.S., states compete to attract firms by offering discretionary tax breaks and subsidies, but little is known about (1) the way states choose their subsidy bids, and (2) whether such subsidies affect firms' location choices. If subsidies cause firms to locate in states where they have larger positive spillovers, subsidy competition can increase total welfare. In this paper, I develop a model of state governments bidding for firms, where states value both the direct and indirect (spillover) job creation of firms. States compete for each firm in an oral ascending auction, and firms take both subsidies and state characteristics into account when choosing their location. To estimate my model, I hand collect a unique dataset on state incentive spending and subsidy deals from 2002-2016. I estimate both the distribution of states' valuations for firms that rationalizes observed subsidy offers, and firms' valuations for state characteristics. I provide the first empirical evidence that states use subsidies to help large firms internalize the positive externality, in the form of indirect job creation, they have on states. Moreover, these subsidies have a sizable effect on firm locations. I estimate that without subsidies approximately 68% of firms would locate in a different state, and the number of anticipated indirect jobs created would decrease by 32%.
Author: Cailin Slattery
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
In the U.S., states compete to attract firms by offering discretionary tax breaks and subsidies, but little is known about (1) the way states choose their subsidy bids, and (2) whether such subsidies affect firms' location choices. If subsidies cause firms to locate in states where they have larger positive spillovers, subsidy competition can increase total welfare. In this paper, I develop a model of state governments bidding for firms, where states value both the direct and indirect (spillover) job creation of firms. States compete for each firm in an oral ascending auction, and firms take both subsidies and state characteristics into account when choosing their location. To estimate my model, I hand collect a unique dataset on state incentive spending and subsidy deals from 2002-2016. I estimate both the distribution of states' valuations for firms that rationalizes observed subsidy offers, and firms' valuations for state characteristics. I provide the first empirical evidence that states use subsidies to help large firms internalize the positive externality, in the form of indirect job creation, they have on states. Moreover, these subsidies have a sizable effect on firm locations. I estimate that without subsidies approximately 68% of firms would locate in a different state, and the number of anticipated indirect jobs created would decrease by 32%.
Author: Johannes Becker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Neil Cobb
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119174333
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 432
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Book Description
Develop a winning business proposal Plan and use a repeatable proposal process Use tools and templates to accelerate your proposals Get the intel on bids and proposals Congratulations! You have in your hands the collected knowledge and skills of the professional proposal writer – without having to be one! Inside, you'll find out how to unlock what these professionals know and apply it to your own business to improve the way you capture new customers and communicate with existing ones! Inside... Develop a great proposal Focus on the customer Know your competition Plan your approach Use tools and templates Write persuasively Overcome misconceptions Expand your skills Avoid proposal killers
Author: Laurent Martin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Book Description
Author: William Schweke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Author: Jerry Jacobs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital investments
Languages : en
Pages : 102
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Book Description
Author: Robert C. Marshall
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262300737
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
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Book Description
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
Author: Nathan M. Jensen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108311423
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 271
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Book Description
Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.
Author: Nicola Dimitri
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521870733
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 562
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Book Description
How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.
