Author: George J. Stack
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 3111725782
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 169
Book Description
Berkeley's analysis of perception
Author: George J. Stack
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 3111725782
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 169
Book Description
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 3111725782
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 169
Book Description
An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision
Author: George Berkeley
Publisher: IndyPublish.com
ISBN:
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Publisher: IndyPublish.com
ISBN:
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Berkeley's Three Dialogues
Author: Stefan Storrie
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198755686
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 230
Book Description
This is the first volume of essays on Berkeley's Three Dialogues, a classic of early modern philosophy. Leading experts cover all the central issues in the text: the rejection of material substance, the nature of perception and reality, the limits of human knowledge, and the perceived threats of skepticism, atheism, and immorality.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198755686
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 230
Book Description
This is the first volume of essays on Berkeley's Three Dialogues, a classic of early modern philosophy. Leading experts cover all the central issues in the text: the rejection of material substance, the nature of perception and reality, the limits of human knowledge, and the perceived threats of skepticism, atheism, and immorality.
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Author: George Berkeley
Publisher: ReadHowYouWant.com
ISBN:
Category : Idealism
Languages : en
Pages : 438
Book Description
Publisher: ReadHowYouWant.com
ISBN:
Category : Idealism
Languages : en
Pages : 438
Book Description
Berkeley's Idealism
Author: Georges Dicker
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 0195381467
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 325
Book Description
Using the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy, Georges Dicker here examines both the destructive and the constructive sides of Berkeley's thought, against the background of the mainstream views that he rejected.
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 0195381467
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 325
Book Description
Using the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy, Georges Dicker here examines both the destructive and the constructive sides of Berkeley's thought, against the background of the mainstream views that he rejected.
Berkeley
Author: Colin Murray Turbayne
Publisher: Manchester University Press
ISBN: 9780719009235
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 378
Book Description
Publisher: Manchester University Press
ISBN: 9780719009235
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 378
Book Description
Berkeley's Puzzle
Author: John Campbell
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191025550
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge and conception of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: even if the things we experience (apples, tables, trees, etc), are mind-independent how does our sensory experience of them enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? George Berkeley thought that sensory experience can only provide us with the conception of mind-dependent things, things which cannot exist when they aren't being perceived. It's easy to dismiss Berkeley's conclusion but harder to see how to avoid it. In this book, John Campbell and Quassim Cassam propose very different solutions to Berkeley's Puzzle. For Campbell, sensory experience can be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things because it is a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Cassam opposes this 'relationalist' solution to the Puzzle and defends a 'representationalist' solution: sensory experience can give us the conception of mind-independent things because it represents its objects as mind-independent, but does so without presupposing concepts of mind-independent things. This book is written in the form of a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience. Although Berkeley's Puzzle frames the debate, the questions addressed by Campbell and Cassam aren't just of historical interest. They are among the most fundamental questions in philosophy.
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191025550
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge and conception of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: even if the things we experience (apples, tables, trees, etc), are mind-independent how does our sensory experience of them enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? George Berkeley thought that sensory experience can only provide us with the conception of mind-dependent things, things which cannot exist when they aren't being perceived. It's easy to dismiss Berkeley's conclusion but harder to see how to avoid it. In this book, John Campbell and Quassim Cassam propose very different solutions to Berkeley's Puzzle. For Campbell, sensory experience can be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things because it is a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Cassam opposes this 'relationalist' solution to the Puzzle and defends a 'representationalist' solution: sensory experience can give us the conception of mind-independent things because it represents its objects as mind-independent, but does so without presupposing concepts of mind-independent things. This book is written in the form of a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience. Although Berkeley's Puzzle frames the debate, the questions addressed by Campbell and Cassam aren't just of historical interest. They are among the most fundamental questions in philosophy.
Berkeley's Argument for Idealism
Author: Samuel C. Rickless
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199669422
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
In the early 18th century George Berkeley made the astonishing claim that physical objects such as tables and chairs are nothing but collections of ideas. Samuel Rickless presents a new account of Berkeley's controversial argument, and suggests it is the philosopher's greatest legacy: not only is it valid, but it may well be sound.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199669422
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
In the early 18th century George Berkeley made the astonishing claim that physical objects such as tables and chairs are nothing but collections of ideas. Samuel Rickless presents a new account of Berkeley's controversial argument, and suggests it is the philosopher's greatest legacy: not only is it valid, but it may well be sound.
Seeing Things as They are
Author: John R. Searle
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199385157
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 255
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceived nor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings, whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field. Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199385157
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 255
Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceived nor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings, whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field. Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.
Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments
Author: Egon Brunswik
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 0520350510
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 0520350510
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description