Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain PDF Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages :

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Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with theory. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. Beyond testing theory, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain PDF Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with theory. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. Beyond testing theory, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Auctions with Resale when Private Values are Uncertain

Auctions with Resale when Private Values are Uncertain PDF Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 59

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Book Description
Auction theory is one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are uncertain. We put our theory to the test by examining both field data and experimental data from the lab. Our field data are from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. More generally, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data.

Auctions with Resale Opportunities

Auctions with Resale Opportunities PDF Author: Chintamani Jog
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue-efficiency trade-off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer-advantaged resale case.

Auctions with Resale

Auctions with Resale PDF Author: Krista Jabs Saral
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. This essay examines a second price auction with uncertain private values in three environments: market-based limited liability, statutory limited liability, and full liability. Market-based limited liability is induced through inter-bidder resale following the auction. Statutory limited liability is created through a default option in the event that a bidder would make a loss. Bids are theoretically shown to be higher under resale, and this result is confirmed in the experimental results. The default option was varied between a high and low penalty. Bid are also theoretically higher under statutory default, but this result only empirically holds for low penalty default, which results in the highest bids. Revenue is highest under a market-based resale limited liability environment, and lowest in the low penalty default treatment given the high rate of default.

An optimal auction when resale cannot be prohibited

An optimal auction when resale cannot be prohibited PDF Author: Charles Zheng
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ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 41

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Asymmetric Auctions with Resale

Asymmetric Auctions with Resale PDF Author: Isa Emin Hafalir
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39

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Book Description
We study equilibria of first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade. In our basic model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing - the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser after updating his prior beliefs based on his winning. We show that a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium. Our main result is that with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The results extend to other resale mechanisms: monopsony and, more generally, probabilistic k-double auctions. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded.

Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities

Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities PDF Author: Philip A. Haile
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Auctions with Resale Markets

Auctions with Resale Markets PDF Author: Philip A. Haile
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Multi-Object Auctions with Resale

Multi-Object Auctions with Resale PDF Author: Marco Pagnozzi
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We analyze the effects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale affects bidders' strategies, and hence the allocation of the objects on sale and the seller's revenue. Our experimental design consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary both the bargaining mechanism and the amount of information available in the resale market. As predicted by theory: without resale, asymmetry among bidders reduces demand reduction; resale increases demand reduction by high-value bidders; low-value bidders speculate by bidding more aggressively with resale. Therefore, resale induces speculation and demand reduction which reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and may not reduce the seller's revenue. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency also reduce the seller's revenue.

The Impact of Resale on 2-bidder First-price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known

The Impact of Resale on 2-bidder First-price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known PDF Author: Thomas Tröger
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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