Two-Bidder All-Pay Auctions with Interdependent Valuations, Including the Highly Competitive Case PDF Download
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Author: Lucas Rentschler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure, we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over disjoint intervals of bids, equilibrium supports can have a rich structure, and non-monotonicity of the equilibrium may result in a positive probability of allocative inefficiency when the value of the prize is not common. Particular attention is paid to the case in which an increase in a bidder's posterior expected value of winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase for the other bidder. Such environments are “highly competitive” in the sense that the bidder's higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively.
Author: Lucas Rentschler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure, we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over disjoint intervals of bids, equilibrium supports can have a rich structure, and non-monotonicity of the equilibrium may result in a positive probability of allocative inefficiency when the value of the prize is not common. Particular attention is paid to the case in which an increase in a bidder's posterior expected value of winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase for the other bidder. Such environments are “highly competitive” in the sense that the bidder's higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively.
Author: Kim-Sau Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 76
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Author: Peter Funk
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Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 11
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Author: Jacques Cremer
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Bo Chen
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations. To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an information disclosure policy through Bayesian persuasion about the bidder with private information. We characterize optimal disclosure and find that optimal disclosure exhibits almost full disclosure, where the uninformed bidder can narrow the informed bidder's private information down to at most two types. We also illustrate our characterization in a simple binary-type setting and investigate issues such as comparative statics, welfare, and efficiency.
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Thomas Kittsteiner
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Richard Mclean
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: Jinwoo Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Book Description
We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium.
