Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-unit Demands PDF Download
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Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Paul Alsemgeest
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author: Srobonti Chattopadhyay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351271075
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 94
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Book Description
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: Harry J. Paarsch
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 454
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Book Description
Accompanying CD-ROM contains data and sample computer code for empirical problems.
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Author: Henner Gimpel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540775544
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Author: Takayuki Ito
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642031897
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 220
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Book Description
Complex Automated Negotiations have been widely studied and are becoming an important, emerging area in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. In general, automated negotiations can be complex, since there are a lot of factors that characterize such negotiations. These factors include the number of issues, dependency between issues, representation of utility, negotiation protocol, negotiation form (bilateral or multi-party), time constraints, etc. Software agents can support automation or simulation of such complex negotiations on the behalf of their owners, and can provide them with adequate bargaining strategies. In many multi-issue bargaining settings, negotiation becomes more than a zero-sum game, so bargaining agents have an incentive to cooperate in order to achieve efficient win-win agreements. Also, in a complex negotiation, there could be multiple issues that are interdependent. Thus, agent’s utility will become more complex than simple utility functions. Further, negotiation forms and protocols could be different between bilateral situations and multi-party situations. To realize such a complex automated negotiati on, we have to incorporate advanced Artificial Intelligence technologies includes search, CSP, graphical utility models, Bays nets, auctions, utility graphs, predicting and learning methods. Applications could include e-commerce tools, decisionmaking support tools, negotiation support tools, collaboration tools, etc. These issues are explored by researchers from different communities in Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent systems. They are, for instance, being studied in agent negotiation, multi-issue negotiations, auctions, mechanism design, electronic commerce, voting, secure protocols, matchmaking & brokering, argumentation, and co-operation mechanisms. This book is also edited from some aspects of negotiation researches including theoretical mechanism design of trading based on auctions, allocation mechanism based on negotiation among multi-agent, case-study and analysis of automated negotiations, data engineering issues in negotiations, and so on.
Author:
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814713708
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 1631
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Book Description
The WSPC Reference on Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the Era of Global Change provides a comprehensive and prominent reference of various highly authoritative volumes of long-term scientific value, for milestone concepts and theories. The books in the reference set are edited by leading experts in the fields of: Game Theory, International Relations and Global Politics, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE): Economy-Wide Modeling, and Experimental Economics. Each book in the reference set includes chapters that are laid out by recognized, broadly respected researchers, in fields associated with issues related to natural resources and environmental policy in the era of global change. The reference set focuses on the economic and strategic aspects of interactions among various parts of society, all dependent on the availability and utilization of limited natural resources and their impact on the environment. Policy implications are addressed, including current challenges and future perspectives.The combination of the four books provides a unique perspective on the issues that engage the public discourse of researchers and policy-makers at state, regional, and global levels. Each of the books in the reference set and all four books as a whole provide coverage of disciplines and angles through which the reader can obtain an understanding of the state-of-the-art of dealing with natural resources and environmental policy in the era of global change. The books in the reference set complement each other and provide a scientific understanding of our ability to address the issues covered.
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.
