Author: Sanmay Das
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642038212
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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Book Description
These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.
Author: Peter Coles
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3642309135
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 123
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Book Description
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Second International ICST on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA 2011) held in New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011. The 22 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from numerous submissions covering topics such as school choice, markets for housing, energy, and advertising, prediction markets, and the theory of market design.
Author: Guillaume Haeringer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262345099
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 393
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Book Description
A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
Author: Gerald B. Sheblé
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461551579
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 348
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Book Description
`Electric energy must be treated as a commodity which can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its time- and space-varying values and costs.` Spot Pricing of Electricity, Schweppe et al, 1988. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation outlines the application of auction methods for all aspects of power system operation, primarily for a competitive environment. A complete description of the industry structure as well as the various markets now being formed is given. A thorough introduction to auction basics is included to explain how auctions have grown in other industries. Auction methods are compared to classical techniques for power system analysis, operations, and planning. The traditional applications of economic dispatch, optimal power flow and unit commitment are compared to auction mechanisms. Algorithms for auctions using linearized power flow equations, DC power flow equations, and AC power flow equations are included. The bundling of supportive services, known as ancillary services within the United States, is discussed. Extensions to the basic auction algorithms for inclusion of supportive services as well as algorithms for scheduling and bidding on generation for GENCOs or independent power producers are presented. Algorithms for scheduling and contracting with customers are also presented for energy service companies. An introduction to the various commodity and financial market products includes the use of futures and options for GENCOs. The material is useful for students performing research on the new business environment based on competition. Regulators will find information on initial methods of designing and evaluating market systems, and power exchange and financial analysts will find information on the interdependence of markets and power system-based techniques for risk management. This information compares the new business environment solutions with old business environment solutions. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation provides a first introduction to how electricity will be traded as a commodity in the future.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Robert A. Schwartz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461516978
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 457
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Book Description
ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ The primary objective of this book is to consider how the inclusion of electronic call auction trading would affect the performance of our U.S. equity markets. The papers it contains focus on the call auction and its role in a hybrid market struc ture. The purpose is to increase understanding of this trading environment, and to consider the design of a more efficient stock market. This book had its origin in a symposium, Electronic Call Market Trading, that was held at New York University's Salomon Center on April 20, 1995. Nearly 150 people from 16 different countries attended. At the time, three proprietary trading systems based on call auction principles (The Arizona Stock Exchange, Posit, and Instinet's Crossing Network) had been operating for several years and interest already existed in the procedure. Since the symposium, increasing use has been made of call auctions, primarily by the ParisBourse in its Nouveau Marchi: and CAC markets, by Deutsche Borse in its Xetra market, and in the U.S. by OptiMark. Rather than being used as stand alone systems, however, call auctions are now being interfaced with continuous markets so as to produce hybrid market structures, a development that is given considerable attention to in a number of the chapters in this book.
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316800245
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
Author: Jayson L. Lusk
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521671248
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 316
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Book Description
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.
Author: Henner Gimpel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540775544
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Author: Sanmay Das
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9783642038563
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 107
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Book Description
These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.
