Auctioning online advertisement space

Auctioning online advertisement space PDF Author: Christian Summerer
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668876002
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24

Get Book Here

Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 2,0, University of Cologne, course: Economic Engineering, language: English, abstract: This termpaper gives a critical synthesis of three scientific contributions dealing with optimal models of charging payments for Internet advertising, an important market of the new economy of the digital era. The theoretical context is game theory. The mentioned papers aim at finding the most efficient form of allocation, that is, a form of allocation which satisfies clients who invest in online advertising as well as search engine companies who offer advertising positions relating to keywords on websites visited by users: Every client should agree with the recent advertisement, and the search engine company should receive the best payment possible. This state of things is called an equilibrium in these papers.

Auctioning Online Advertisement Space

Auctioning Online Advertisement Space PDF Author: Christian Summerer
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 9783668876019
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24

Get Book Here

Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 2,0, University of Cologne, course: Economic Engineering, language: English, abstract: This termpaper gives a critical synthesis of three scientific contributions dealing with optimal models of charging payments for Internet advertising, an important market of the new economy of the digital era. The theoretical context is game theory. The mentioned papers aim at finding the most efficient form of allocation, that is, a form of allocation which satisfies clients who invest in online advertising as well as search engine companies who offer advertising positions relating to keywords on websites visited by users: Every client should agree with the recent advertisement, and the search engine company should receive the best payment possible. This state of things is called an equilibrium in these papers.

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions PDF Author: Rad Niazadeh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with complementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.

Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions

Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions PDF Author: Francesco Decarolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency.

Sponsored Search Auctions

Sponsored Search Auctions PDF Author: Song Yao
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601982283
Category : Brand loyalty
Languages : en
Pages : 66

Get Book Here

Book Description
Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities

Optimal Bidding and Experimentation for Multi-Layer Auctions in Online Advertising

Optimal Bidding and Experimentation for Multi-Layer Auctions in Online Advertising PDF Author: Nian Si
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
The digital advertising industry heavily relies on online auctions, which are mostly of first-price type. For first-price auctions, the success of a good bidding algorithm crucially relies on accurately estimating the highest bid distribution based on historical data which is often censored. In practice, a sequence of first-price auctions often takes place through multiple layers, a feature that has been ignored in the literature on data-driven optimal bidding strategies. In this paper, we introduce a two-step algorithmic procedure specifically for this multi-layer first-price auction structure. Furthermore, to examine the performance of our procedure, we develop a novel inference scheme for A/B testing under budget interference (an experimental design which is also often used in practice). Our inference methodology uses a weighted local linear regression estimation to control for the interference incurred by the amount of spending in control/test groups given the budget constraint. Our bidding algorithm has been deployed in a major demand-side platform in the United States. Moreover, in such an industrial environment, our tests show that our bidding algorithm outperforms the benchmark algorithm by 0.5% to 1.5%.

Auctions for Targeted Television Advertising

Auctions for Targeted Television Advertising PDF Author: Mark Steven Zschocke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94

Get Book Here

Book Description
Television advertising is a billion-dollar industry in the United States. Currently, advertisers place their messages in television programs that are estimated to have a high proportion of their target demographic viewers. The advertising spots are usually purchased months in advance at set list prices or at negotiated prices. Technologies that can place advertisements at the cable box level, instead of the program level, will provide advertisers with the ability to target any demographic group directly and in real-time. This thesis explores the new decision-making required by this new technology and how the television advertisement space can be sold more effectively. In particular, it compares a list price system to a number of new auction models. The structure of the auctions for the new targeted television advertising system is unique and has not been previously studied in the literature. This thesis explores new auction models that can capture these unique features and lead to desirable results for the seller of the advertisement space.

The Everything Online Auctions Book

The Everything Online Auctions Book PDF Author: Steve Encell
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 160550338X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 320

Get Book Here

Book Description
The Everything Online Auctions Book is an inside look at how to buy or sell anything on eBay and other notable online auction sites. Steve Encell, one of the most successful dealers in the field of online auctions, gives readers the real low down on the online marketplace. Includes: Finding the right sites to buy or sell Tips on how to avoid scams, fraud, and identity theft Taking advantage of perks and promotions Organizing and maximizing business earning potential 50-plus screenshots for step-by-step instruction

The Auction App: How Companies Tap the Power of Online Auctions to Maximize Revenue Growth

The Auction App: How Companies Tap the Power of Online Auctions to Maximize Revenue Growth PDF Author: Leland Harden
Publisher: McGraw Hill Professional
ISBN: 0071406220
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 314

Get Book Here

Book Description
How companies such as L. L. Bean and Sun Microsystems are using online auctions to help boost their bottom lines From liquidating excess inventory to B2B materials procurement, corporate America has discovered online auctions as a catalyst for redefining old supply-chain relationships and business practices. Most analysts consider them the next big business opportunity. The Auction App details the tools and tactics employed by Sun Microsystems, Coca-Cola, and companies of any size and virtually every industry for creating, conducting, managing, and executing online auctions. Greater numbers of businesses will be able to discover the numerous profitable advantages of utilizing online auctions. The Auction App shows them how to: Liquidate excess inventory Acquire new customers cost-effectively Conduct real-time market research Provide new avenues of cooperation between sellers and suppliers

EBay Secrets

EBay Secrets PDF Author: Steven Ellis White
Publisher: Krug Industries, Inc.
ISBN: 0976024012
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 68

Get Book Here

Book Description
Do you want to make more money on eBay (or any other Internet auction site)? Or, are you looking for an easy second income? Thousands of new users are joining eBay every day. You can take advantage of this trend and make a lot of money. But before you get started, there are some things you need to know. eBay Secrets will walk you though the steps to getting your Internet auction business rolling. It is packed full of tips and secrets that will help you get more money for your auction listings. eBay Secrets is based on the techniques that Steve White has been teaching students in his exclusive seminars on making money on eBay. Never before have all of Mr. White's powerful money-making secrets been available in book format. Here are just a few of the topics that are covered in the book:? The two most important secrets to making money on eBay.? 14 places to find cheap things to sell? 15 techniques to increase the number of bids you get? Three things you should NEVER do in an eBay listing? Ten tricks that will make your listings much more effective? The best starting bid for your items? Why your title is critical? A three-step process to find the perfect title? Four words to include in your titles to get even more money for your items? The best time to list your items? Why you should never use a reserve? The one thing that you should never mention in the description? Which listing options are worth the extra cost? How to avoid paying to have pictures in your listings? The only eight things that you need to get started making money on eBay? Seven ways you can get started with no money? Why user feedback is misleading? How to write a description that gets more bids? Everything you need to know about writing HTML in your listings? What to charge for shipping? A printable checklist so you never forget any steps when creating listings? Four email templates for common situations? What to do if someone doesn't pay? Examples of the best and worst auctions? And much, much more ...

Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions

Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions PDF Author: Francesco Decarolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19

Get Book Here

Book Description
As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case of agency bidding under an alternative auction format (specifically, the VCG mechanism). We propose a simple algorithm that a search engine can use to reduce efficiency and revenue losses.