Auction design with interdependent valuations : the generalized revelation principle, efficiency, full surplus extraction and information acquisition PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Auction design with interdependent valuations : the generalized revelation principle, efficiency, full surplus extraction and information acquisition PDF full book. Access full book title Auction design with interdependent valuations : the generalized revelation principle, efficiency, full surplus extraction and information acquisition by Claudio Mezzetti. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
Get Book Here
Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we establish that the equilibrium level exceeds the socially optimal level of information with positive interdependence. The individual decisions to acquire information are strategic substitutes. The difference between the equilibrium and the efficient level of information acquisition is increasing in the interdependence of the bidders' valuations and decreasing in the number of informed bidders.
Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262321831
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 199
Get Book Here
Book Description
A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Author: Chiara M. Travisi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Meta-analysis
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Giuseppe Di Vita
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Natural resources
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Srobonti Chattopadhyay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351271067
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Get Book Here
Book Description
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Author: Ingo Bräuer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Biodiversity conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 24
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023154457X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Get Book Here
Book Description
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
