Author: Mr.Alexander W. Hoffmaister
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451922329
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.
Asset Prices, Financial Liberalization, and the Process of Inflation in Japan
Author: Mr.Alexander W. Hoffmaister
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451922329
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451922329
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.
Asset Prices, Financial Liberalization and the Process of Inflation in Japan
Author: Alexander W. Hoffmaister
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
This paper examines the extent to which the Japanese asset price cycle of the 1980s was determined by monetary factors, the real business cycle, and financial liberalization. Strong evidence is found of a shift in the relationships between monetary factors and land price inflation in the early 1980s. In particular, the estimated parameters of a vector autoregression imply that the transmission of monetary factors to asset prices was greater in the 1980s than In the 1970s. A key conclusion is that monetary shocks led to more asset price inflation and less consumer price inflation in the 1984-93 period than during 1970-83.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
This paper examines the extent to which the Japanese asset price cycle of the 1980s was determined by monetary factors, the real business cycle, and financial liberalization. Strong evidence is found of a shift in the relationships between monetary factors and land price inflation in the early 1980s. In particular, the estimated parameters of a vector autoregression imply that the transmission of monetary factors to asset prices was greater in the 1980s than In the 1970s. A key conclusion is that monetary shocks led to more asset price inflation and less consumer price inflation in the 1984-93 period than during 1970-83.
Asset Prices, Financial Stability, and Monetary Policy
Author: Shigenori Shiratsuka
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
The Mechanism and Economic Effects of Asset Price Fluctuations
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial crises
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial crises
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Book Description
Recent Economic Bubbles and Possible Implications for Economic Policy
Author: Sophia Kuehnlenz
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3656542465
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2013 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Bamberg, course: Volkswirtschaftslehre Dynamische Wirtschaftspolitik, language: English, abstract: Repeatedly bubbles occur during times of “extended investments in infrastructure such as canals or railroads”(Charles P. Kindleberger, “Manias, Panics and Crashes“, p. 10) or around technological inventions that are made available for the general public such as cars, electricity, phone – lines and the internet. They go hand in hand with financial inventions, financial liberalization and excess leverage. Examples are, among many others, the Japanese Asset Price bubble of the late 1980ies and early 1990ies, the Dot-Com bubble 1997–2000, as well as the recent Financial Crisis 2007-2008. Frequently these bubbles are fueled by the overoptimistic outlook not only of the so-called experts or gurus but also by the extremely positive perception of the general public resulting in a “this – time – is - different – feeling”, “new – era – talks” or the “it –won’t happen – to – us – believe”(See for example Shiller, Kindleberger, Reinhart and Rogoff, Galbraith). Most of the time these bubbles are self – feeding processes. Business expansion leads to economic growth and greater income. Public spending increases which leads to the need of expanding production. Credit is needed for investment and during times of a boom it is easily made available. Often new financial instruments come into play as well as the deregulation of financial markets to meet the demand for credit. Businesses can expand further which results in ever increasing income and greater expectations about the future. Creditors become less risk averse and grant loans to individuals or firms that would have not met the necessary requirements before. People feel richer since their wealth is re – classified so that their assets and property are all of the sudden worth more for no realistic reason (renovate a home for example which would account for an increase in value). In combination with low interest rates, more and more investments and purchases are financed through excess leverage creating a vicious cycle of easy credit, money illusion and the adjustment of fundamental values. Great hikes in the markets are considered as a result of the new economy that has been created. Historical levels of the markets and where the level of fundamentals should really be are completely ignored. Currently we can only assess bubbles in retrospective, psychological factors which may help to explain the unexplainable are hardly considered in basic economic models.The only thing that is certain is that bubbles always burst.
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3656542465
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2013 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Bamberg, course: Volkswirtschaftslehre Dynamische Wirtschaftspolitik, language: English, abstract: Repeatedly bubbles occur during times of “extended investments in infrastructure such as canals or railroads”(Charles P. Kindleberger, “Manias, Panics and Crashes“, p. 10) or around technological inventions that are made available for the general public such as cars, electricity, phone – lines and the internet. They go hand in hand with financial inventions, financial liberalization and excess leverage. Examples are, among many others, the Japanese Asset Price bubble of the late 1980ies and early 1990ies, the Dot-Com bubble 1997–2000, as well as the recent Financial Crisis 2007-2008. Frequently these bubbles are fueled by the overoptimistic outlook not only of the so-called experts or gurus but also by the extremely positive perception of the general public resulting in a “this – time – is - different – feeling”, “new – era – talks” or the “it –won’t happen – to – us – believe”(See for example Shiller, Kindleberger, Reinhart and Rogoff, Galbraith). Most of the time these bubbles are self – feeding processes. Business expansion leads to economic growth and greater income. Public spending increases which leads to the need of expanding production. Credit is needed for investment and during times of a boom it is easily made available. Often new financial instruments come into play as well as the deregulation of financial markets to meet the demand for credit. Businesses can expand further which results in ever increasing income and greater expectations about the future. Creditors become less risk averse and grant loans to individuals or firms that would have not met the necessary requirements before. People feel richer since their wealth is re – classified so that their assets and property are all of the sudden worth more for no realistic reason (renovate a home for example which would account for an increase in value). In combination with low interest rates, more and more investments and purchases are financed through excess leverage creating a vicious cycle of easy credit, money illusion and the adjustment of fundamental values. Great hikes in the markets are considered as a result of the new economy that has been created. Historical levels of the markets and where the level of fundamentals should really be are completely ignored. Currently we can only assess bubbles in retrospective, psychological factors which may help to explain the unexplainable are hardly considered in basic economic models.The only thing that is certain is that bubbles always burst.
Asset Price Bubbles, Price Stability, and Monetary Policy
Author: Kunio Okina
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Assets (Accounting)
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
The Transition of Finance in Japan and the United States: A Comparative Perspective
Author: Thomas F. Cargill
Publisher: Hoover Press
ISBN: 9780817987237
Category : Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 260
Book Description
Publisher: Hoover Press
ISBN: 9780817987237
Category : Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 260
Book Description
The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve
Author: Thomas Cargill
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Explaining Asset Bubbles in Japan
Author: Takatoshi Ito
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
This paper examines the stock and land price behaviors during the bubble economy period (the second half of the 1980s), paying considerable attention to the linkage of the two markets and the effects of monetary policy. In particular, we examine whether the booms in these asset prices can be justified by changes of the fundamental economic variables such as the interest rates or the growth of the real economy. A complex chain of events is needed to explain the process of asset price inflation and deflation. Our empirical results suggest (i) that the initial increases of asset prices are sown by a sharp increase in bank lending to real estate; (ii) that a considerable comovement between stock and land prices is consistent with a theory that emphasizes the relationship between the collateral value of land and cash flow for constrained firms; (iii) that although the real economy was doing well and the interest rates were still low, asset price increases from mid-1987 to mid-1989 cannot be fully justified by the movement of fundamentals alone; and (iv) the stock price increase in the second half of 1989 and the land price increase in 1990 is not explained by any asset pricing model based on fundamentals or rational bubbles.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
This paper examines the stock and land price behaviors during the bubble economy period (the second half of the 1980s), paying considerable attention to the linkage of the two markets and the effects of monetary policy. In particular, we examine whether the booms in these asset prices can be justified by changes of the fundamental economic variables such as the interest rates or the growth of the real economy. A complex chain of events is needed to explain the process of asset price inflation and deflation. Our empirical results suggest (i) that the initial increases of asset prices are sown by a sharp increase in bank lending to real estate; (ii) that a considerable comovement between stock and land prices is consistent with a theory that emphasizes the relationship between the collateral value of land and cash flow for constrained firms; (iii) that although the real economy was doing well and the interest rates were still low, asset price increases from mid-1987 to mid-1989 cannot be fully justified by the movement of fundamentals alone; and (iv) the stock price increase in the second half of 1989 and the land price increase in 1990 is not explained by any asset pricing model based on fundamentals or rational bubbles.
Japanese Banks and the Asset Price "Bubble"
Author: Mr.Steven M. Fries
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451954301
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
With the recent collapse of the asset price “bubble,” Japanese banks encountered significant pressure from both a sharp decline in the value of equity holdings and a marked increase in bad loans. In August 1992, the Government initiated measures that stabilized equity prices and assisted banks in managing their nonperforming loans. While the major banks disclosed that 4.6 percent of their total loans were nonperforming at the end of FY 1992, a mechanical estimate of all banks’ nonperforming and restructured loans is 6-7 percent of their total loans--a serious yet manageable problem. The main policy implications are to ensure the reasonably prompt resolution of the bad loan problem and to enhance market discipline to prevent its recurrence.
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451954301
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
With the recent collapse of the asset price “bubble,” Japanese banks encountered significant pressure from both a sharp decline in the value of equity holdings and a marked increase in bad loans. In August 1992, the Government initiated measures that stabilized equity prices and assisted banks in managing their nonperforming loans. While the major banks disclosed that 4.6 percent of their total loans were nonperforming at the end of FY 1992, a mechanical estimate of all banks’ nonperforming and restructured loans is 6-7 percent of their total loans--a serious yet manageable problem. The main policy implications are to ensure the reasonably prompt resolution of the bad loan problem and to enhance market discipline to prevent its recurrence.