Another Explanation for Overbidding and Another Bias for Underbidding in First-price Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Oliver Kirchkamp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Author: Oliver Kirchkamp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Oliver Kirchkamp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Martin Peitz
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199978638
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 615
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Book Description
The economic analysis of the digital economy has been a rapidly developing research area for more than a decade. Through authoritative examination by leading scholars, this handbook takes a closer look at particular industries, business practices, and policy issues associated with the digital industry. The volume offers an up-to-date account of key topics, discusses open questions, and provides guidance for future research. It offers a blend of theoretical and empirical works that are central to understanding the digital economy. The chapters are presented in four sections, corresponding with four broad themes: 1) infrastructure, standards, and platforms; 2) the transformation of selling, encompassing both the transformation of traditional selling and new, widespread application of tools such as auctions; 3) user-generated content; and 4) threats in the new digital environment. The first section covers infrastructure, standards, and various platform industries that rely heavily on recent developments in electronic data storage and transmission, including software, video games, payment systems, mobile telecommunications, and B2B commerce. The second section takes account of the reduced costs of online retailing that threatens offline retailers, widespread availability of information as it affects pricing and advertising, digital technology as it allows the widespread employment of novel price and non-price strategies (bundling, price discrimination), and auctions. The third section addresses the emergent phenomenon of user-generated content on the Internet, including the functioning of social networks and open source. The fourth section discusses threats arising from digitization and the Internet, namely digital piracy, privacy, and security concerns.
Author: Björn Bartling
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
This paper studies the impact of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both the payoffs of other bidders and the seller's revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent.
Author: Charles A. Holt
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691188971
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
From a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided
Author: Andreas Roider
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of the valuations of bidders. In contrast, in first-price auctions, there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where bidders anticipate (constant) positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing. Even if the emotional (dis-)utilities are very small, the revenue-maximizing reserve price might be significantly different from the standard model. Moreover, decreases with the number of bidders.
Author: Oliver Kirchkamp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and spite can be used to rationalize deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions. We exploit that equilibrium predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spiteful preferences are different than those for risk averse preferences. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not only can spite rationalize observed bids, also our measure for spite is consistent with observed bids.
Author: Robert J. Brent
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1847204147
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 493
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Book Description
Acclaim for first edition: The author succeeds in bringing together many interesting real-life applications of CBA in various areas (including among others health, environment and transportation). The examples are well chosen to illustrate the basic issues and show clearly the crucial importance of theoretical and assumptions. Moreover, they are presented in an accessible amethodologicalnd attractive way. For those who know already the principles of CBA, these applications are stimulating and enjoyable reading. Erik Schokkaert, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management This fully updated new edition continues in the vein of its predecessor by viewing cost benefit analysis as applied welfare economics, while at the same time building on the earlier framework by extending the theory and providing further applications in each chapter. New for this edition are analyses of theory related applications in mental health, condom social marketing programs, female primary education as a means of preventing HIV/AIDS and the pricing of natural gas. Presented in an integrated manner, the theoretical concepts are constructed around the main building blocks of CBA, such as shadow pricing, distribution weights, the social discount rate and the marginal cost of public funds. This edition will cement the book s place as a major and accessible text in the field and will be of great interest to graduate and undergraduate students of welfare economics and microeconomic theory, as well as government economists involved with any area of public policy.
Author: Chulyoung Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider a scenario where a single indivisible object is auctioned off to three bidders and among the three bidders there is one bidder whose winning imposes a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. We theoretically and experimentally compare two standard sealed-bid auction formats, first-price and second-price auctions, under complete information. Using a refinement of undominated Nash equilibria, we analyze equilibrium bids and outcomes in the two auction formats. Our experimental results show that overbidding relative to equilibrium bids is prevalent, especially in second-price auctions, and this leads to higher revenue and lower efficiency in second- price auctions than in first-price auctions, especially under negative externalities. Our results are consistent with previous experimental findings that bidders tend to overbid more in second-price auctions than in first-price auctions, and they suggest that such a tendency is robust to the introduction of externalities.
Author: David J. Cooper
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper presents results from a series of second price private value auction (SPA) experiments in which bidders are either given for free, or are allowed to purchase, noisy signals about their opponents' value. Even though theoretically such information about opponents' value has no strategic use in the SPA, it provides us with a convenient instrument to change bidders' perception about the "strength" (i.e., the value) of their opponent. We argue that the empirical relationship between the incidence and magnitude of overbidding and bidders' perception of the strength of their opponent provides the key to understand whether overbidding in second price auctions are driven by "spite" motives or by the "joy of winning." The experimental data show that bidders are much more likely to overbid, though less likely to submit large overbid, when they perceive their rivals to have similar values as their own. We argue that this empirical relationship is more consistent with a modified "joy of winning" hypothesis than with the "spite" hypothesis. However, neither of the non-standard preference explanations are able to fully explain all aspects of the experimental data, and we argue for the important role of bounded rationality. We also find that bidder heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining their bidding behavior.
