An Experimental Study on Sequential Auctions with Privately Known Capacities PDF Download
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Author: Luca Corazzini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
We experimentally study bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Treatment differs in the ex-ante probability distribution of sellers' capacities and in the (exogenous) probability that the second auction is actually implemented. Our results show that: (i) bidding behavior in the second auction conforms with sequential rationality; (ii) while first auction's bids negatively depend on capacity, bidders seem unable to recognize this link when, at the end of the first auction, they state their beliefs on the opponent's capacity. To rationalize this inconsistency between bids and beliefs, we conjecture that bidding in the first auction is also affected by a hidden, behavioral type - related to the strategic sophistication of bidders - that obfuscates the link between capacity and bids. Building on this intuition, we show that a simple level-k model may help explain the inconsistency.
Author: Luca Corazzini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
We experimentally study bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Treatment differs in the ex-ante probability distribution of sellers' capacities and in the (exogenous) probability that the second auction is actually implemented. Our results show that: (i) bidding behavior in the second auction conforms with sequential rationality; (ii) while first auction's bids negatively depend on capacity, bidders seem unable to recognize this link when, at the end of the first auction, they state their beliefs on the opponent's capacity. To rationalize this inconsistency between bids and beliefs, we conjecture that bidding in the first auction is also affected by a hidden, behavioral type - related to the strategic sophistication of bidders - that obfuscates the link between capacity and bids. Building on this intuition, we show that a simple level-k model may help explain the inconsistency.
Author: Isabelle Brocas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions, subjects' bidding behavior is excessively similar across units and across mechanisms at the aggregate level. We provide two (complementary) explanations for these departures. One is bounded rationality. Subjects do not fully comprehend subtle differences between mechanisms. The other is self-selection. Subjects are very heterogeneous and some of them deviate more from equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and exit the auction, leaving those who play closer to theoretical predictions to bid for the third good. Support for this hypothesis comes from the documented higher bidding, lower efficiency and lower profits associated with the first and second unit compared to the third one.
Author: Carolyn Pitchik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Dino Ahr
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642170226
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 504
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Book Description
This volume contains a selection of papers referring to lectures presented at the symposium "Operations Research 2003" (OR03) held at the Ruprecht Karls-Universitiit Heidelberg, September 3 - 5, 2003. This international con ference took place under the auspices of the German Operations Research So ciety (GOR) and of Dr. Erwin Teufel, prime minister of Baden-Wurttemberg. The symposium had about 500 participants from countries all over the world. It attracted academians and practitioners working in various field of Opera tions Research and provided them with the most recent advances in Opera tions Research and related areas in Economics, Mathematics, and Computer Science. The program consisted of 4 plenary and 13 semi-plenary talks and more than 300 contributed papers selected by the program committee to be presented in 17 sections. Due to a limited number of pages available for the proceedings volume, the length of each article as well as the total number of accepted contributions had to be restricted. Submitted manuscripts have therefore been reviewed and 62 of them have been selected for publication. This refereeing procedure has been strongly supported by the section chairmen and we would like to express our gratitude to them. Finally, we also would like to thank Dr. Werner Muller from Springer-Verlag for his support in publishing this proceedings volume.
Author: Werner Güth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Author: Regina Betz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.
Author: Lian Jian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
While both simultaneous and sequential contests are mechanisms used in practice such as crowdsourcing, job interviews and sports contests, few studies have directly compared their performance. By modeling contests as incomplete information all-pay auctions with linear costs, we analytically and experimentally show that the expected maximum effort is higher in simultaneous contests, in which contestants choose their effort levels independently and simultaneously, than in sequential contests, in which late entrants make their effort choices after observing all prior participants' choices. Our experimental results also show that efficiency is higher in simultaneous contests than in sequential ones. Sequential contests' efficiency drops significantly as the number of contestants increases. We also discover that when participants' ability follows a power distribution, high ability players facing multiple opponents in simultaneous contests tend to under-exert effort, compared to theoretical predictions. We explain this observation using a simple model of overconfidence.
Author: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400883172
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 776
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Book Description
An indispensable survey of new developments and results in experimental economics When The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research. Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied. Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economics Features contributions by leading experts Describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and more Highlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each other Includes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied
Author: Ji Yong Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper examines what connection, if any, there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelations being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes the use of such auctions for inferring homegrown values problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important, as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from observed bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. Our results suggest that considering subjects' cognitive ability in homegrown valuation studies can help identify the true underlying demand conditions.
