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Author: John Baylis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198280125
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
Author: John Baylis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198280125
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
Author: Ronald E. Blum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 169
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Book Description
The paper attempts to fill an existing substantive gap in the literature of strategic deterrence by presenting both theoretical analysis and a historical case study of ambiguity in deterrence threats.
Author: Ronald Evan Blum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Ambiguity
Languages : en
Pages : 608
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Book Description
Author: Donald E. Blum
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 169
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Book Description
Author: Brett V. Benson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549041412
Category : International relations
Languages : en
Pages : 195
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Book Description
Intuition and international relations theory both affirm that commitments should be firm and transparent in order to be credible. Because ambiguity is believed to cut against the credibility of the commitment, it is commonly assumed that ambiguous commitments are inimical to cooperation and invite conflict. Why then do states often choose to make commitments that are deliberately ambiguous? The tension between the current state of international relations theory and empirical international politics presents a puzzle: anomalous ambiguous commitments occur despite prevailing theoretical predictions that they should undermine the credibility of the commitment by signaling weakness, creating incentives for opportunism, and, increasing the chances for misperception. My research uses formal theory, surveys, and cases studies to model and test three-party security agreements to demonstrate that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice, and, under certain conditions, ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more transparent alternatives. I demonstrate that under certain conditions deliberately ambiguous security commitments can work to deter challengers from destabilizing the status quo when transparently communicated alternatives would have the unintended consequence of bringing about the very outcome they are designed to prevent. In making this argument, my dissertation research makes three significant contributions to the study of international politics. First, it shifts our focus from credibility to variation in the type of commitment. Second, it challenges our intuition and scholarly presumption that information and transparency are strictly better by identifying some conditions under which actors are better off being ambiguous. Third, it distinguishes between various deterrence strategies for addressing dual deterrence dilemmas. In addition to the general contributions to the study of international politics, my research also adds to our understanding of the historical strategic interactions between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists and offers insights and policy implications regarding the ongoing security tensions between China and Taiwan.
Author: John Baylis
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780191684357
Category : Deterrence (Strategy)
Languages : en
Pages : 495
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Book Description
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
Author: Abram N. Shulsky
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 9780833028532
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 85
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Book Description
China's recent reforms have led to unprecedented economic growth; if this continues, China will be able to turn its great potential power into actual power. The result could be, in the very long term, the rise of China as a rival to the United States as the world's predominant power; in the nearer term, China could become a significant rival in the East Asian region. In this context, the issue for U.S. policy is how to handle a rising power, a problem that predominant powers have faced many times throughout history. It is the contention of this report that the future Sino-U.S. context will illustrate many of the problems of deterrence theory that have been discussed in recent decades; deterrence theory will be, in general, more difficult to apply than it was in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War context. The key may be to seek nonmilitary means of deterrence, i.e., diplomatic ways to manipulate the tension to China's disadvantage.
Author: Yuan-kang Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Taiwan
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: David M. Franklin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deterrence (Strategy)
Languages : en
Pages : 151
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Book Description
"This study analyzes how the new nuclear declaratory policy, espoused in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, balances the goals of deterrence and nonproliferation. The author concludes that increasing complexity in the nuclear arena makes reliance on the legacy policy of "calculated ambiguity" both increasingly hazardous for deterrence and decreasingly effective as a nonproliferation tool. These detrimental outcomes demand innovation in strategic thinking and revision of nuclear declaratory policy, specifically through adoption of a sole-purpose nuclear policy. Employed in the assessment of the new policy is a multiple methodological approach using historical, theoretical and practical frameworks. This study undertakes an appraisal of historic deterrence policies and nonproliferation initiatives exposing the essential elements of each. Building off these assessments, a comparative analysis of the new policy, dubbed "Lead-but-Hedge", and a sole-purpose policy illuminates the strengths and shortfalls of each. Finally, the author examines the strategic consequences of the new policy on the nuclear decision-making of allies (Japan), competitors (India), and rivals (Iran). The inquiry finds that in an era of salient WMD threats, it is necessary to communicate more directly the risks and consequences associated with WMD use against the US and its interests. Adoption of a sole-purpose policy by the US best accomplishes this goal while balancing the requirements of deterrence, on the one hand, and the Obama administration's top priority of nonproliferation on the other."--Abstract.
Author: Naval Studies Board
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309553237
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
