Author: Douglas K. Anning
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781422457795
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Corporate Governance Implications of Nonprofit Executive Compensation
Author: Douglas K. Anning
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781422457795
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781422457795
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Corporate Governance Implications on Nonprofit Executive Compensation
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices
Author: Frederick D. Lipman
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 9780470283035
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 9780470283035
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Pay without Performance
Author: Lucian Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Responsible Executive Compensation for a New Era of Accountability
Author: Peter T. Chingos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
Publisher Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
Publisher Description
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation
Author: Stephen G. Sapp
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance-related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organizations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Book Description
This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance-related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organizations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.
Signaling Theory in Human Service Nonprofit Organizations
Author: Lisa L. Forbes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Nonprofit organizations
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Book Description
This research uses multiple regression analysis to investigate whether the level of executive compensation in small, medium, and large human service nonprofits affects donor giving, exploring both implications for nonprofit governance and the possibility that nonprofits use executive compensation as a signal to donors of the organization's mission focus. When giving to nonprofit organizations, donors often have no clear way of knowing if their contributions will be used as intended. Donors must therefore either trust the organizations to which they contribute or look for signals of organizations' intent and integrity. Nonprofit organizations may use executive compensation as a signal of dedication to mission, as excessive executive compensation in nonprofits is an area of concern to donors as well as regulators. Findings of this study suggest that while executive compensation levels do not affect donor decision-making in small organizations, executive pay levels do impact donor giving in large organizations and, to some extent, in medium-sized organizations. In both medium and large human service nonprofits, study results suggest that sophisticated donors pay more attention to relative scaled executive compensation: when executive compensation as a percentage of total expenses is higher than average, sophisticated donors contribute less. On the other hand, unsophisticated donors appear to pay more attention to total executive compensation: as executive compensation increases, unsophisticated donors contribute more. These findings imply that executive compensation is not an effective signaling or governance tool in small organizations but that it may be used as a donor monitoring device in medium and large organizations. To the extent that donors to large and medium-sized human service organizations see executive compensation as a signal, evidence suggests sophisticated donors view compensation as signaling dedication to mission, while unsophisticated donors view executive compensation as a signal of leadership competence.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Nonprofit organizations
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Book Description
This research uses multiple regression analysis to investigate whether the level of executive compensation in small, medium, and large human service nonprofits affects donor giving, exploring both implications for nonprofit governance and the possibility that nonprofits use executive compensation as a signal to donors of the organization's mission focus. When giving to nonprofit organizations, donors often have no clear way of knowing if their contributions will be used as intended. Donors must therefore either trust the organizations to which they contribute or look for signals of organizations' intent and integrity. Nonprofit organizations may use executive compensation as a signal of dedication to mission, as excessive executive compensation in nonprofits is an area of concern to donors as well as regulators. Findings of this study suggest that while executive compensation levels do not affect donor decision-making in small organizations, executive pay levels do impact donor giving in large organizations and, to some extent, in medium-sized organizations. In both medium and large human service nonprofits, study results suggest that sophisticated donors pay more attention to relative scaled executive compensation: when executive compensation as a percentage of total expenses is higher than average, sophisticated donors contribute less. On the other hand, unsophisticated donors appear to pay more attention to total executive compensation: as executive compensation increases, unsophisticated donors contribute more. These findings imply that executive compensation is not an effective signaling or governance tool in small organizations but that it may be used as a donor monitoring device in medium and large organizations. To the extent that donors to large and medium-sized human service organizations see executive compensation as a signal, evidence suggests sophisticated donors view compensation as signaling dedication to mission, while unsophisticated donors view executive compensation as a signal of leadership competence.
Governance and Executive Compensation
Author: William Forbes
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781784713768
Category : Compensation management
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781784713768
Category : Compensation management
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The Law of Associations
Author: George D. Webster
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Professional associations
Languages : en
Pages : 891
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Professional associations
Languages : en
Pages : 891
Book Description
New York Nonprofit Law and Practice
Author: Victoria B. Bjorklund
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781558344945
Category : Nonprofit organizations
Languages : en
Pages : 767
Book Description
This one-volume reference guide is a must for attorneys or other individuals organizing, managing, or serving as board members of New York nonprofit organizations. New York Nonprofit Law & Practice provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique legal issues of this burgeoning practice area, offering advice & practical guidance from three leading experts.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781558344945
Category : Nonprofit organizations
Languages : en
Pages : 767
Book Description
This one-volume reference guide is a must for attorneys or other individuals organizing, managing, or serving as board members of New York nonprofit organizations. New York Nonprofit Law & Practice provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique legal issues of this burgeoning practice area, offering advice & practical guidance from three leading experts.