Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium PDF Download
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Author: Ahmad Peivandi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
We develop a general equilibrium model of competitive banks to examine the optimal design of bank regulation. There is a continuum of equilibria of the unregulated economy that feature varying relative sizes of the financial and real sectors. The unregulated economy underinvests (overinvests) in production when aggregate risk is below (above) a threshold. An efficient allocation is implemented by a range of regulatory policies comprising of capital and liquidity requirements, deposit insurance, and bailouts financed by taxes, but there is a unique regulated equilibrium for a given regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements move in opposing directions; an optimal regulatory policy that features a stricter capital requirement has a looser liquidity requirement. When aggregate risk is low, the efficient allocation can be implemented via deposit insurance and taxation, but capital and liquidity requirements are necessary to ensure a unique regulated equilibrium. When aggregate risk is high, all four regulatory tools are essential components of an optimal regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements that implement efficient regulatory policies do not vary with aggregate risk when it is below a threshold, but become tighter as aggregate risk increases above the threshold. Depositor subsidies via deposit insurance and tax shields are efficient when aggregate risk is low, but inefficient when it is high.
Author: Ahmad Peivandi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
We develop a general equilibrium model of competitive banks to examine the optimal design of bank regulation. There is a continuum of equilibria of the unregulated economy that feature varying relative sizes of the financial and real sectors. The unregulated economy underinvests (overinvests) in production when aggregate risk is below (above) a threshold. An efficient allocation is implemented by a range of regulatory policies comprising of capital and liquidity requirements, deposit insurance, and bailouts financed by taxes, but there is a unique regulated equilibrium for a given regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements move in opposing directions; an optimal regulatory policy that features a stricter capital requirement has a looser liquidity requirement. When aggregate risk is low, the efficient allocation can be implemented via deposit insurance and taxation, but capital and liquidity requirements are necessary to ensure a unique regulated equilibrium. When aggregate risk is high, all four regulatory tools are essential components of an optimal regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements that implement efficient regulatory policies do not vary with aggregate risk when it is below a threshold, but become tighter as aggregate risk increases above the threshold. Depositor subsidies via deposit insurance and tax shields are efficient when aggregate risk is low, but inefficient when it is high.
Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451865570
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Author: World Bank
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 1464814414
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
Seventeen in a series of annual reports comparing business regulation in 190 economies, Doing Business 2020 measures aspects of regulation affecting 10 areas of everyday business activity.
Author: Mr.Fabian Valencia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475513933
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Recent studies show that uncertainty shocks have quantitatively important effects on the real economy. This paper examines one particular channel at work: the supply of credit. It presents a model in which a bank, even if managed by risk-neutral shareholders and subject to limited liability, can exhibit self-insurance, and thus loan supply contracts when uncertainty increases. This prediction is tested with the universe of U.S. commercial banks over the period 1984-2010. Identification of credit supply is achieved by looking at the differential response of banks according to their level of capitalization. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, increases in uncertainty reduce the supply of credit, more so for banks with lower levels of capitalization. These results are weaker for large banks, and are robust to controlling for the lending and capital channels of monetary policy, to different measures of uncertainty, and to breaking the dataset in subsamples. Quantitatively, uncertainty shocks are almost as important as monetary policy ones with regards to the effects on the supply of credit.
Author: Mark Carey
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226092984
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 669
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Book Description
Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events—such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode—has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risks affecting financial institutions and explores a variety of methods to help institutions and regulators more accurately measure and forecast risk. The contributors--from academic institutions, regulatory organizations, and banking--bring a wide range of perspectives and experience to the issue. The result is a volume that points a way forward to greater financial stability and better risk management of financial institutions.
Author: Jihad Dagher
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513539337
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank’s capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or resorting to public recapitalizations of banks in past banking crises. The paper also looks at the welfare costs of tighter capital regulation by reviewing the evidence on its potential impact on bank credit and lending rates. Its findings broadly support the range of loss absorbency suggested by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee for systemically important banks.
Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Author: Bengt Holmstrom
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262518538
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
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Book Description
Two leading economists develop a theory explaining the demand for and supply of liquid assets. Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one. In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions. In a slight, but important, departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk-sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions.
Author: Mr.Anton Korinek
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475546084
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic efficiency. This paper, by contrast, puts the distributive implications of financial regulation center stage. We develop a model in which the financial sector benefits from risk-taking by earning greater expected returns. However, risktaking also increases the incidence of large losses that lead to credit crunches and impose negative externalities on the real economy. We describe a Pareto frontier along which different levels of risktaking map into different levels of welfare for the two parties. A regulator has to trade off efficiency in the financial sector, which is aided by deregulation, against efficiency in the real economy, which is aided by tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit. We also show that financial innovation, asymmetric compensation schemes, concentration in the banking system, and bailout expectations enable or encourage greater risk-taking and allocate greater surplus to the financial sector at the expense of the rest of the economy.
Author: Jin Cao
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136459774
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Book Description
This book is a review on the economic theories of systemic risks in the financial market and the topics in constructing the macroprudential framework for banking regulation in the future. It explains the reasons why the traditional microprudential regulatory framework missed its target in stabilizing the market and preventing the crisis, and discusses the principles and instruments for designing macroprudential rules.
