Agency and Answerability

Agency and Answerability PDF Author: Gary Watson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199272271
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 388

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Book Description
Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?.

Agency and Answerability

Agency and Answerability PDF Author: Gary Watson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199272271
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 388

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Book Description
Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?.

Agency and Answerability

Agency and Answerability PDF Author: Gary Watson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780191709968
Category : Agent
Languages : en
Pages : 377

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Book Description
Charting the progress of Watson's thought over three decades, this collection of essays on human action examines such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do?

Agency and Answerability

Agency and Answerability PDF Author: Gary Watson
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191569232
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 387

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Book Description
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Responsibility from the Margins

Responsibility from the Margins PDF Author: David Shoemaker
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198715676
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281

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Book Description
This study develops a pluralistic quality of will theory of responsibility, motivated by our ambivalence to real life cases of marginal agency, such as those with clinical depression, scrupulosity, psychopathy, autism, intellectual disability, and more. Our ambivalent responses suggest that such agents are responsible in some ways but not others. A tripartite theory is developed to account for this fact of our ambivalence via exploration of the appropriateness conditions of three distinct categories of our pan-cultural emotional responsibility responses: attributability, answerability, and accountability.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology PDF Author: Manuel Vargas
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019264551X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 1121

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Book Description
Moral psychology is the study of how human minds make and are made by human morality. This state-of-the-art volume covers contemporary philosophical and psychological work on moral psychology, as well as notable historical theories and figures in the field of moral psychology, such as Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Buddha. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology's fifty chapters, authored by leading figures in the field, cover foundational topics, such as character, virtue, emotion, moral responsibility, the neuroscience of morality, weakness of will, and the nature of moral judgments and reasons. The volume also canvases emerging work in applied moral psychology, including adaptive preferences, animals, mental illness, poverty, marriage, race, bias, and victim blaming. Collectively, the essays form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame PDF Author: Audrey L. Anton
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 0739191764
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 216

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Book Description
This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates several examples in which agents are not causally responsible for any morally relevant consequences, but they seem to be deserving of praise or blame nonetheless. Anton concludes that such cases are counterexamples to the primacy assumption, and turns her attention towards discerning what grounds desert of praise and blame if not retrospective moral responsibility. Anton advances the moral attitude account, whereby agents deserve praise and blame in virtue of moral attitudes they have in response to moral reasons. These moral attitudes must be sufficiently sincere, which means they reach a threshold that distinguishes such attitudes as eligible for praise and blame. Anton adds that whether one deserves praise or blame and to what degree is sensitive to the agent’s personal moral progress as well as the status quo of her society. This addition brings with it the welcome consequence that morality may be objective, but we are still justified in judging one another charitably based on personal and societal limitations.

Fair Opportunity and Responsibility

Fair Opportunity and Responsibility PDF Author: David O. Brink
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198859465
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 439

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Book Description
Fair Opportunity and Responsibility lies at the intersection of moral psychology and criminal jurisprudence and analyzes responsibility and its relations to desert, culpability, excuse, blame, and punishment. It links responsibility with the reactive attitudes but makes the justification of the reactive attitudes depend on a prior and independent conception of responsibility. Responsibility and excuse are inversely related; an agent is responsible for misconduct if and only if it is not excused. As a result, we can study responsibility by understanding excuses. We excuse misconduct when an agent's capacities or opportunities are significantly impaired, because these capacities and opportunities are essential if agents are to have a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This conception of excuse tells us that responsibility itself consists in agents having suitable cognitive and volitional capacities - normative competence - and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities free from undue interference - situational control. Because our reactive attitudes and practices presuppose the fair opportunity conception of responsibility, this supports a predominantly retributive conception of blame and punishment that treats culpable wrongdoing as the desert basis of blame and punishment. We can then apply the fair opportunity framework to assessing responsibility and excuse in circumstances of structural injustice, situational influences in ordinary circumstances and in wartime, insanity and psychopathy, immaturity, addiction, and crimes of passion. Though fair opportunity has important implications for each issue, treating them together allows us to explore common themes and appreciate the need to take partial responsibility and excuse seriously in our practices of blame and punishment.

Futures, Visions, and Responsibility

Futures, Visions, and Responsibility PDF Author: Martin Sand
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658226846
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 306

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Book Description
Martin Sand explores the problems of responsibility at the early, visionary stages of technological development. He discusses the increasingly dominant concept of innovation and outlines how narratives about the future are currently used to facilitate technological change, to foster networks, and to raise public awareness for innovations. This set of activities is under increasing scrutiny as a form of “visioneering”. The author discusses intentionality and freedom as important, albeit fuzzy, preconditions for being responsible. He distinguishes being from holding responsible and explores this distinction’s effects on the problem of moral luck. Finally, he develops a virtue ethical framework to discuss visioneers’ and innovators’ responsibilities.​

Karl Barth's Moral Thought

Karl Barth's Moral Thought PDF Author: Gerald McKenny
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192845527
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 218

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Book Description
Does theological ethics articulate moral norms with the assistance of moral philosophy? Or does it leave that task to moral philosophy alone while it describes a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life? These questions lie at the very heart of theological ethics as a discipline. Karl Barth's theological ethics makes a strong case for the first alternative. Karl Barth's Moral Thought follows Barth's efforts to present God's grace as a moral norm in his treatments of divine commands, moral reasoning, responsibility, and agency. It shows how Barth's conviction that grace is the norm of human action generates problems for his ethics at nearly every turn, as it involves a moral good that confronts human beings from outside rather than perfecting them as the kind of creature they are. Yet it defends Barth's insistence on the right of theology to articulate moral norms, and it shows how Barth may lead theological ethics to exercise that right in a more compelling way than he did.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility PDF Author: Dana Kay Nelkin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190679301
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 783

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Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible.