A Note on Third Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets PDF Download
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Author: Youping Li
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.
Author: Youping Li
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This note studies third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets. I show that whether a more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher or lower price than a less efficient firm depends on the shape of the demand function. Different from the case in which final market demand is linear, the usual assumption in the literature, constant elasticity demand, for example, results in a more efficient firm's receiving a discount.
Author: Charles Adams
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Languages : en
Pages : 7
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The paper points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures can result in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of price discrimination. Building on earlier work in the derivation of quality-differentiated demand (see SSRN 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773 and 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103), the paper compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for monopoly power in manipulating quality choices. The example provided illustrates the potential for substantially greater profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for.
Author: Yong He
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Category : Markets
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Alexandre de Cornière
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers' type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm's ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation.
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
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Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Babu Nahata
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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This pedagogical note discusses the differences between second and third-degree price discrimination. The comparison uses four important factors, namely, market segmentation, information about consumers, profit maximization and social welfare. The comparison shows that while market segmentation is a prerequsite for third-degree, it is an equilibrium outcome in second-degree price discrimination. The profit maximization problem is unconstrained under third-degree but it is constrained under second-degree. Both deadweight loss and consumer surplus are positive under third-degree, but they both can be zero under second-degree and the social surplus is maximum.
Author: Edward J. Lopez
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on the method by which demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare relative to uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.
Author: Claudia Salim
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Sylvain Weber
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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The objective of this paper is to assess how the marginal revenue of a monopoly should be plotted when the market is segmented between consumers with different demands, both in the discriminating and non-discriminating cases. The presentations offered by industrial organization textbooks concerning third-degree price discrimination are not always clear, and we believe this is due to the fact that the marginal revenue is different for both types of monopolies, even though the demands they face are absolutely identical. The quantity produced in equilibrium can therefore diverge significantly if price discrimination is feasible or not. Under certain circumstances, price discrimination may improve the situation of every market agent, producer as well as consumers.
Author: Yann Braouezec
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 10
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We introduce in this paper the quot;incompletequot; third-degree price discrimination, which is the situation in which a monopolist must charge at most k different prices while the total market is composed of n (local) markets, with ngt;k. We thus study the optimal partition problem of the n markets in k groups. As a byproduct, when k=2, we can reconsider the so-called weak-strong markets partition.
